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ABSTRACT 
Schools, especially those at the K-12 academic levels, have, to this point, not been 
viewed as critical infrastructure, which is especially true for the state of Florida. 
Consequently, plans have been slow to be developed that address the continuity of this 
level of education. This oversight would lead to a loss of academic continuity if a school 
were damaged or rendered unusable for any length of time, which could cause a 
cascading failure within the community, which has occurred in other states, such as 
Mississippi, Alabama and Missouri. The loss of such facilities has impacted both the 
economic and operational response to local disasters, which is especially important in 
those communities that by their very location may be affected by disasters more than 
other locations. This situation is especially true for the state of Florida as it is impacted 
by numerous factors that could cause the cessation of academic requirements by law. 
For schools to maintain this academic continuity, Continuity of Operations Plans 
(COOPs) should be developed. For the state of Florida, guidance is provided, and 
statutorily identified requirements are identified, for state governmental and university 
organizations to have COOPs; in the case of K-12 schools, it is not required or identified. 
This research explores what policy and strategy would be required to develop a K-12 
academic level COOP, as well as those elements that would need to be included in its 
development. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The events of 9/11 revealed a fundamental weakness in the continued operation of 
organizational programs without the means or plans to do so, which was evidenced by the 
terrorist attacks that resulted in the destruction and loss of the several governmental 
operations without the means to continue. Prior to this time, Continuity of Government 
(COG) plans focused on the loss of federal government operations and plans were 
devised to continue governmental operation in case of a nuclear attack. It was never 
foreseen that such plans would be needed for other organizational programs, as these 
were nearly non-existent. As a result of this attack, in combination with other natural 
disaster events, it was realized that Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) would be 
needed to ensure operational capability is maintained to provide services to the public. 
Numerous disasters have impacted the state of Florida over the past 20 years, 
which have included flooding, severe storms, tornadoes and the ever present threat of 
hurricanes. As a result, Florida recognized the need for governmental agencies, and those 
organizations that support the college and universities systems, to develop planning 
criteria for creating COOPs to support continuing operations. This requirement was 
promulgated in Florida statutes and requires that these organizations develop such plans 
to meet the requirements outlined for their operation.  
The issue that has emerged, as it concerns COOP, involves the need for Florida 
K-12 school systems to develop these plans. Florida neither requires, as is identified in 
statutes, nor has policy or guidance, to develop such plans to meet the requirements of a 
COOP for this level of academic endeavors. As a result of this need, guidance and policy 
recommendation are explored and postulated for consideration and inclusion in the 
development of such plans. 
COOP development policy and guidance has been developed and implemented by 
other governmental organizations in the United States and provides a starting point for 
the creation of such documentation. Using previously created guidance documents, 
applicable COOPs can be developed utilizing associated checklists and suggested sub-
 xii
categories for inclusion. Each of these sub-categories is explored at length and outlines 
the basic framework of a viable COOP program. Additionally, specific items that should 
be considered for each sub-category, as they affect K-12 schools, are provided for 
consideration. While these suggestions for inclusion are not exhaustive, they do provide a 
reference point to be used to stimulate further inclusion of identified needs. It is realized 
that each school will differ in its educational programs, but a basic guidance is provided 
for consideration in its application. 
Educational and governmental organizations throughout the United States have 
developed and employed COOPs. Five of these plans are reviewed to provide additional 
informational guidance in the overall planning framework. These plans provide a best 
practice consideration for inclusion.  
Finally, recommendations for COOP development and inclusions are provided for 
consideration. These recommendations are meant as a starting point for the development 
of local COOPs, but can be utilized for application across the state of Florida. 
Additionally, suggested Florida statute change is addressed to provide a legal requirement 
for the inclusion of K-12 schools along with the requirement of other governmental 
agencies, universities and schools. 
State legislative representatives should consider the application of the suggested 
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I. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLANS: POLICY AND 
STRATEGY FOR K-12 SCHOOLS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA 
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT  
School systems within the state of Florida are not prepared for the possibility of 
loss of operational capability from an all-hazards incident. Schools in Florida, because of 
the state’s topography, are more susceptible to natural disasters. Hurricanes have 
impacted the state many times and no point within the state is further than 80 miles from 
a coast. In addition, many schools are located near possible hazardous materials sites, or 
other dangers, such as train movement centers and major highways. Despite these 
dangers, most schools in the state lack Continuity of Operation Plans (COOPs).  
At present, the requirement to institute COOPs is limited to institutions of higher 
education. Naturally, most of the consumers of education in the state are at the K-12 
levels; consequently, if schools were rendered unusable for any length of time due to 
natural or man-made disasters, a serious breach in the continuance of the educational 
process could occur and affect a wide swath of the population. 
Schools in the state of Florida have not sought to design, develop, and test COOPs 
to ensure functional and recovery capabilities. Issues, such as alternate facilities, 
computer and informational services, as well as human resources, are not addressed to 
ensure continual operations of the learning environment. Other capabilities, such as food 
services and transportation, are also key functions not identified to ensure that the routine 
of school is re-established and the local community is functioning. 
Facilities will be one of the key factors in restoration under a COOP. School 
buildings represent a safe learning environment for children and provide a symbol for 
parents that they, at the very least, have some confidence that their children are cared for 
and continuing their educational endeavors. Furthermore, schools, through legal and 
statutorily established requirements, may be required to be open to provide instructional 
operations. In reviewing documentation concerning a COOP for schools, federal entities 
have not provided specific guidance for the development of continuity plans for K-12 
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schools. In reviewing directives outlined in homeland security presidential directives, the 
primary focus has been on the development of plans for the continuity of federal entities, 
but no requirements at lower levels of government are codified to develop these plans. 
This fact provides a unique and obviously dangerous circumstance for schools operating 
within certain localities and certain states. 
Florida statutes outline more specificity in the requirements to develop COOPs, 
but the requirement for the K-12 schools is not evident in the wording of the law. The 
2010 Florida Statute 252, Military Affairs and Related Matters, outlines specifically who 
must develop these plans and who is responsible for them, the Division of Emergency 
Management. Florida Statute 252:365 (3) states: 
These individuals shall be responsible for ensuring that each state agency 
and facility, such as a prison, office building, or university, has a disaster 
preparedness plan that is coordinated with the applicable local emergency-
management agency and approved by the division. (Emergency 
Management, 2010) 
The mention of K-12 schools does not appear within the statute, and therefore, it 
must be construed that no such requirement exists. Florida Statute 252:365 (3)(b) further 
identifies what must be considered when developing a plan to meet continuity 
requirements, which includes elements, such as: 
…identification of essential functions, programs, and personnel; 
procedures to implement the plan and personal notification and 
accountability, delegations of authority and lines of succession; 
identification of alternative facilities and related infrastructure, including 
those for communication; identification and protection of vital records and 
data bases; schedules and procedures for periodic test, training, and 
exercises. (Emergency Management, 2010) 
Again, the parameters are established for the development of a COOP, but 
specifics addressing the need for K-12 schools to do so, is clearly absent. Due to this fact, 




Schools represent the normalcy of local life within a community. After a crisis, 
such as was seen during Hurricane Katrina, the return of children to a school represents 
the fact that the community is returning to its prior condition before the incident 
happened. If facilities are destroyed, records compromised and human resources are non-
existent to present curriculum, the school ceases to function as a societal entity both in a 
physical and non-physical sense. 
Schools are not prepared to address a situation specifically in which COOP 
requirements on campus are needed. Even though previous incidences of school loss of 
operational capability have occurred, the focus, at this point, is still on the all-hazards 
approach of emergency planning. It is evident that a COOP is required, especially in the 
state of Florida, for state level organizations by statute, but is not required for local K-12 
operations. Florida statutes specifically identify other agencies within the state required to 
have COOP development and identifies, although in a general framework, the areas that 
need to be considered when such plans are developed.  
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What should policy and strategy for COOPs in K-12 schools look like in 
the state of Florida? 
2. What elements should be included in COOPs in K-12 schools for the state 
of Florida? 
3. Does a developed and established COOP assist in continued operations of 
a K-12 school? 
C.  METHOD 
In the state of Florida, requirements do not exist for the development of COOPs at 
the K-12 level. Consequently, present COOPs have been at the behest of the local school 
district and are not standardized across the state. As of this date in Florida, only one K-12 
school COOP has been completed with another in the planning stages. This fact limits 
any review of these plans for the state as a whole and requires that other venues be 
reviewed for applicability to the K-12 level of planning.  
 4 
 
The case study method is used to review identified plans and to develop 
recommendations for inclusions in COOPs for the K-12 level. Both the lack of COOP 
development for K-12 school levels in Florida, as well as a standardized COOP 
framework, is the reason for this approach.  
The first step in the case study application is the review of previous plans 
developed by various entities located throughout the United States, as well as Florida. 
This review is designed to elicit best practices and guidance for developing COOPs for 
K-12 schools. 
To assist in the review efforts of the selected case studies, the Continuity 
Assistance Tool (CAT) Continuity Assistance for Non-Federal Entities (States, 
Territories, Tribal, and Local Government Jurisdictions and Private Sector 
Organizations) will be consulted to assist in identifying best practice operational areas, 
which provides a baseline data guide for COOP exploration. The basic premise of the 
CAT is: 
[T]o establish industry-wide benchmarks for the management, overall 
performance, and readiness of organizations to respond to a continuity 
event. The tool allows for organizations throughout the United States to 
examine their continuity capability by utilizing and easy-to-use national 
and uniform method to identify gaps in the continuity programs and justify 
the funding and resources needed for improvements. Through identifying 
and filling these gaps, viable continuity programs can be established to 
help keep organizations functioning during emergencies. (USDHS, 2009b, 
p. i) 
To ensure an adequate sampling of applicable plans, five COOPs are reviewed 
from the entities located both inside and outside Florida. These plans are drawn from 
both the academic and private sectors of application. These five COOPS are the 
following. 
 University of Virginia 
 College of William and Mary 





 Piedmont Virginia College 
 Lake Sumter-Metropolitan Planning Organization 
This review provides an across the board COOP example for operational 
procedures and programs implementation within the state of Florida.  
The final step is a review of sources from government, both federal and state, 
private industry and other state undergraduate school organizations, to develop applicable 
policy and strategy components for K-12 schools.  
D.  HYPOTHESIS 
Within the communities of government, universities and businesses, a COOP has 
become somewhat standardized. While differences are evident in some small areas, the 
established framework provides the ability to develop policy and guidance using these as 
a model to provide a framework for implementation within the K-12 school operational 
environment. It is, therefore, a belief that (1) elements of a viable COOP can be identified 
to develop and design a framework for implementation, (2) a viable COOP can be 
developed for schools within the state of Florida, and (3) the developed COOP can be 
successfully validated in its application.  
E.  SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis examines the various K-12 School COOPs in place within the United 
States. In the state of Florida, these plans are not statutorily required to be developed; 
therefore, a significant gap is created in the planning process for schools within the state. 
Due to the number of disasters that affect the state each year, schools should implement 
such plans. This lapse in proposed school operational concerns is indicative of other 
states that will benefit from the results of this research.  
The research, once completed, can be used by the state of Florida for further 
development of a COOP for its individual school districts that have not begun the process 
to do so. The framework and policy guidance can be employed throughout the United 
States as a whole and provide a cost effective application for the development of these 
plans. Those involved in the development of these plans will have an easy to apply 
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guidance document that can be adapted to their present educational operational 
framework with little to no cost to the existing budget. The policy and guidance will be of 
a “non-specific” operational application as to provide the baseline guidance and policy to 
ease the application of the framework. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is subdivided within the categories of information as they 
relate to COOPs for schools. These categories are (1) governmental reports, (2) journal 
articles, and (3) conference reports. Each category was reviewed through available 
literary information as it affects K-12 school systems. 
A.  GOVERNMENTAL REPORTS 
While many reports dealing with plans have been published concerning 
emergencies within the school environment most, if not all, do not focus on the specifics 
of schools continuity. Even less documentation exists concerning the development of 
frameworks for COOPs. The 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan Partnering to 
Enhance Protection and Resiliency (Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. 3) does 
not specifically mention schools (educational facilities) as part of the infrastructure to 
protect and only lists it in a subsection in the footnotes. The 2003 National Strategy for 
the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets mentions schools 
briefly as it relates to the use of electricity. “Almost every form of productive activity-
whether in business, manufacturing plants, schools, hospitals or homes-require 
electricity” (Department of Homeland Security, 2003, p. 50). The 2007 National Strategy 
for Homeland Security (Homeland Security Council, n.d.) fails to mention schools in any 
of its associated literature. 
In other documents published by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
even less information is provided. In two published reports, Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased 
Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience 2010 (Government Accountability Office, 
2010a) and Critical Infrastructure Protection DHS Efforts to Assess and Promote 





Accountability Office, 2010b), any mention of “educational facilities” is again relegated 
to footnotes of the report. No specific information is provided as schools being 
considered critical infrastructure. 
Prior to the completion and publication of these reports, the GAO had submitted 
two other reports that did provide insight into the protection of schools. The first report, 
Emergency Management Status of School Districts’ Planning and Preparedness, states 
that: 
Few school districts’ emergency plans contain procedures for continuing 
student education in the event of an extended school closure, such as a 
pandemic outbreak, although it is a federally recommended practice….[It 
is estimated]…that 56 of the school districts do not include 
any…procedures in their plans for the continuation of student education 
during an extended school closure. Without such procedures school 
districts may not be able to educate students during a school closure that 
could last from several days to a year or longer (Government 
Accountability Office, 2007a, p. 15)  
The second report, Emergency Management Most School Districts Have 
Developed Emergency Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional Federal 
Guidance, focused on the fact that “…95% of all school districts have written emergency 
plans, but content varies” (Government Accountability Office, 2007b, Overview). The 
report continued to state further that, “…most school districts have procedures in their 
plans for staff roles and responsibilities, for example, school districts have not widely 
employed such procedures as, academic instruction via local radio or television, for 
continuing student education in the event of a school closure….” Government 
Accountability Office, 2007b, Overview). The report did highlight a conclusion that 
identified reasons why more is not done when completing preparation for such events. 
“Based on [the] survey of districts, we estimate that in 70 per cent of all school districts, 
officials struggle to balance priorities related to educating students and other 
administrative responsibilities with activities for emergency management” (Government 
Accountability Office, 2007b, p. 6). While indicative to any organization that the threat is 
not a constant, it should not preclude the agencies from developing COOPs to maintain 
operational capability of schools. 
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In further review of the government literature available on schools, more 
emphasis was placed on threats directly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
than is occurring today. In December 2003, the Federal Emergency Management 
Administration (FEMA), under the Risk Management Series, developed a document to 
assist in making schools safer, but still did not address the continuity of operation issues 
that faced schools. The document entitled Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case 
of Terrorist Attacks (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003b) was focused more 
on the structural and physical issues versus an all-encompassing strategy to provide for 
the eventuality of loss of educational continuity. Specifically, the information was 
outlined: 
…to provide the design community and school administrators with the 
basic principles and techniques to make a school that is safe from terrorist 
attacks and at the same time is functional, aesthetically pleasing, and 
meets the needs of the students, staff, administration, and general public. 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2003b, p. i) 
FEMA has taken the lead in providing informational guidance on protection 
strategies, but not so much on developing continuity of operations in educational 
endeavors. One example of this effort can be found in the publication entitled Building A 
Disaster Resistant University whose main purpose was to provide “… planning guidance 
to these institutions as they prepare to identify their risk, assess their vulnerability to 
natural and man-made hazards, and develop a hazard mitigation plan” (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2003a, p. iii). However, as with other information 
provided by FEMA, much of the information is “…a multi-hazard approach…” (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2003a, p. 3). Granted that much of what is covered can 
be applied in many varied situations, much of the information, however, falls short in 
applicability where a COOP focus is needed.  
Other governmental documents identify the importance of COOP development, 
one as an afterthought and the other with more specificity in its application. In the United 
States Department of Education ERCM Express Creating Emergency Management Plans, 
a COOP is treated as something done in the recovery phase of emergency management. 
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Specifically, “[e]xample of recovery activities include:…[d]eveloping and practicing a 
Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) at the school and school district levels” (p. 3). 
Other documents, such as United States Department of Education Lessons Learned from 
School Crisis and Emergencies Recovering from Natural Disasters: Preparation Is the 
Key, provide more specificity in its requirements, but still fall short of an actual 
application of methods in developing COOPs. The report states that: 
A Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) ensures that both SEAs [State 
Education Agency] and LEAs [Local Education Agency] will have the 
capability to continue essential functions across a wide range of hazards. 
The object of a COOP is to ensure continued performance of essential 
educational functions, reduce or mitigate disruptions to operations and 
achieve a timely recovery and reconstitution of the learning environment. 
COOPs should include procedures to: institute a system for registering 
out-of-state and district students; registering students into other district 
schools; identifying, in advance, who has responsibility for closing 
schools; and sending students and staff to alternate locations. (p. 3) 
Again, the specifics for the development of COOPs do not appear in the literature 
and it must be construed that no such development documentation exists for K-12 
schools. 
The 2010 Florida Statute 252, Military Affairs and Related Matters outlines 
specifically who must develop these plans and who is responsible for them, the Division 
of Emergency Management. Florida Statute 252:365 (3) states: 
These individuals shall be responsible for ensuring that each state agency 
and facility, such as a prison, office building, or university, has a disaster 
preparedness plan that is coordinated with the applicable local emergency-
management agency and approved by the division. (Emergency 
Management, 2010) 
The mention of K-12 schools does not appear within the statute, and therefore, 
must be construed that no such requirement exists. The statute further identifies what 
must be considered when developing a plan to meet continuity requirements. Florida 




The disaster-preparedness plan must outline a comprehensive and 
effective program to ensure continuity of essential state functions under all 
circumstances. The plan must identify a baseline of preparedness for a full 
range of potential emergencies to establish a viable capability to perform 
essential functions during any emergency or other situation that disrupts 
normal operations. 
The plan must include, at a minimum, the following elements: 
identification of essential functions, programs, and personnel; procedures 
to implement the plan and personal notification and accountability, 
delegations of authority and lines of succession; identification of 
alternative facilities and related infrastructure, including those for 
communication; identification and protection of vital records and data 
bases; schedules and procedures for periodic test, training, and exercises. 
(Emergency Management, 2010) 
Again, the parameters are established for the development of a COOP, but 
specifics addressing the need for K-12 schools to do so, is clearly absent. Due to this fact, 
the requirement, or need to do so, is left up to interpretation by the individual school 
districts. As with many school districts located within the United States, if it is not 
mandated, it is not completed. 
The importance of a COOP is mentioned as it pertains to those schools that 
support Student and Exchange Visitors Programs (SEVP), and the U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, under United States Department of Homeland Security. The Fact 
Sheet, Continuity of Operations Planning for SEVP-Approved School “…encourages all 
SEVP-certified schools to explore a Continuity of Operations (COOP) plan” (United 
States Department of Homeland Security, n.d.g). The term “encourages” does not place 
specificity in regards to required development of a plan for K-12 schools and leaves open 
to interpretation the requirements, or necessity, to do so. As previously identified, no 
developmental requirement or guidance is exhibited. 
B.  JOURNAL ARTICLES 
Much like governmental documents, information concerning COOP development 




Even though the subject is only touched upon in minute examples, it must be considered 
within this collection to give support and credence to the need for developing some form 
of COOP guidance for K-12 level education.  
In many journal reports concerning COOPs, explanations are given as to why they 
should be developed. As Collins (2007) indicates, “In the wake of September 11th and 
Hurricane Katrina, many school districts reviewed their crisis preparedness plans, 
instituting changes based on new threats or mistakes made by other institutions suffering 
through these over whelming events” (p. 46). However, in review of much of the 
literature available, this is not the case and the planning portion of the COOP is severely 
lacking in execution. She continues further to identify the underlying failure of many 
plans developed, when they are developed. 
The maintenance of crisis management plans constitutes the final concern 
for emergency preparation and represents the most-often ignored aspect of 
crisis plan formation. While failure of an organization to with stand a 
crisis often transpires due to the sheer lack of an active crisis management 
plan, more often than not a deteriorated plan reflects the actual culprit of 
poor response….A deteriorated management plan may represent more of a 
limitation to an organization’s ability to withstand a crisis than no plan at 
all as it symbolizes a false sense of security in the midst of an acute event. 
(p. 52) 
In considering a COOP for schools, much reliance rests on the meaning of 
“emergency plans” and the false sense of security that other agencies will somehow come 
to their aid when required. Repeatedly, this belief has proven a falsehood and over-
dependence on these entities has resulted in a total collapse of the operational status of 
the educational process. 
Regardless of the current situation concerning the idea of education first, “…the 
first decade has impressed on educators the need for emergency preparedness and a 
proactive posture with respect to external threats to successful school operation” 
(Ketterer, 2007, p. 5). To prove this point, consider the events that have occurred, such as 
Hurricane Katrina that struck the Gulf Coast in 2006 and the tornado that struck the 
Enterprise High School in Enterprise, AL., in 2007. Due to these incidences, “ …a plan 
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for the recovery of essential academic, operational, business and personnel data sets with 
the aim of restoring normal operations…” (Ketterer, 2007, p. 5) is of paramount 
importance. 
C.  CONFERENCE REPORTS 
As with other materials found on the subject of COOP development in schools, 
the subject coverage is minor or, as has been previously identified, considered in minor 
detail of all-hazards planning. A great deal of the planning and preparation for such 
topics or threats is left up to the individual community or school itself. School Safety in 
the 21st Century: Adapting to New Security Challenges Post 9/11 (National Strategy 
Forum, 2003, p. 4) clearly indicates that every day over 53,000,000 children are engaged 
in either the school itself and/or daycare activities. Without a place to continue their 
education, children will be forced to stay home or attend schools in other districts. This 
situation also has the effect of hampering parents, especially from the aspect of having to 
stay home and care for their children, which leads to a ripple effect across a community 
that causes more widespread strain on the economy and various secondary problems.  
As with other reviewed reports, this report again evaluates the possibility of a 
response as an “all-hazards” approach. Yet again, without a viable COOP, it may not be 
as effective a strategy versus examining the development of COOPs specifically and what 
can be done before, during and after as a whole. The report falls far short of what is 
needed to meet COOP requirements and, like other reports, provides, at best, a list of 
things that should be considered, but not how to accomplish them. Much of the 
information, or the planning, is left to the individual schools.  
While a great deal of available information exists within federal and state 
governmental systems, most information is of an all-hazards approach and does not 
specifically focus on what must be done at the local level to meet COOP requirements for 
schools. Schools, especially those at the K-12 level, rate only a cursory mention in most 
of the literature identified. Schools do not meet, according to governmental 
documentation, the title of “critical infrastructure.” Although schools provide both a 
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physical and psychological representation of the community, very little information on 




III. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLANS—OVERVIEW 
For the state of Florida, as previously identified, COOPs for schools are not 
statutorily required. Individual initiative by independent school districts has resulted in 
some schools developing these plans, but this number is extremely small. To provide an 
overview of viable COOP development, organizations must look towards entities that 
have developed COOPs for their individual counties or to universities and colleges that 
have developed COOPs. Numerous counties and city municipal agencies within the state 
of Florida have developed these plans, and provide an excellent basis and guide for the 
development of COOPs for schools at the K-12 levels.  
The statutory requirement for universities finds that some universities have met 
this requirement while others have not. Again, agencies must look toward the private 
sector and universities for examples of COOPs that can be applied to operational 
environment for schools districts. 
Schools, like businesses, are functional entities that provide a product. By 
reframing the operations of a school and looking as students as an end product, the school 
can be seen as a system developing future financial products that will impact other 
processes that make a community a community. If that process is interrupted, it causes a 
ripple effect within the entire community and provides for a financial loss to the 
community as a whole. A COOP is a process that garnered new meaning after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 and has continued to flourish in various businesses and 
organization right down to the level of the educational and governmental communities. 
As of this moment, colleges and other governmental agencies have, or are in the process 
of, developing COOPs for their organizations. However, one key element lost in the 
development of these plans is the K-12 school system. In a community, the school system 
is the center of activity for those who have small children and work. Schools also provide 
a “de facto” childcare center where working parents can place their children and provide 




impacted, as parents who cannot work at the various businesses must stay home with the 
children. This effect could be as devastating as if a building were hit that provided 
financial employment for the community.  
In 2011, numerous disasters from fire, hurricanes and tornadoes struck the United 
States and caused massive loss of life, and damage, from which many communities will 
never recover. In these disasters, many school districts were impacted and their facilities 
were rendered useless and unable to continue the educational process. In the city of 
Joplin, MO, a tornado destroyed significant portions of the school system infrastructure, 
which caused a significant cessation and disruption of the educational process. With no 
COOP required, and no COOP established, it took nearly three months for the school to 
return to operation and most of the educational process was conducted at alternate 
facilities. These facilities had to be obtained after the disaster struck. 
The possibility of loss of a facility from other natural disaster, such as flooding, 
may cause a COOP to be activated to meet the educational needs of a school system. In 
Minot, ND: 
The overflowing Souris River pushed 11,000 people from their homes and 
wrecked six schools, three beyond repair. Nearly 20% of the district’s 
7,000 students will be in replacement classrooms set up in churches, the 
city auditorium and dozens of portable trailer-like buildings scattered 
around town, an arrangement that may last two or three years. (Nationline, 
p. 3A) 
As the article indicates, these schools may be operating in these replacement 
facilities long enough for sophomores to graduate.  
In many cases, illness outbreaks may cause schools to become unusable and 
require the activation of a continuity plan. In South Carolina recently, “…80 students, 
teacher and other staff were absent at the Honea Path Elementary School because of an 
infection by the shigella bacteria” (Barker, 2008).  
COOPs will never provide all the needed answers to the questions that arise, nor 




process of outlining the requirements to reconstitute operations of the school educational 
processes. The COOP will provide a starting point, and a process, to reestablish 
operations in a shorter time versus no plan at all. 
A.  WHY COOP? 
The 2007 Emergency Management-Most School Districts Have Developed 
Emergency Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional Federal Guidance 
report noted that “[f]ew school districts’ emergency plans contained procedures for 
continuing student education in the event of an extended school closure, such as a 
pandemic outbreak, although it is a federally recommended practice” (p. 31). As it 
concerns COOPs, the inherent weakness in application planning for such an event would 
seem to be the driving factor for inclusion, or at the very least development, of such 
plans.  
The issue of childrens’ access to education following a disaster is 
fundamentally the same as access to education at any time. It is incumbent 
upon education authorities to “expect the unexpected” and to have 
adequate contingency plans for educational continuity in the face of a 
variety of know hazards. (Petal, 2008, p. 20) 
A COOP is important for the survival of the current operational framework of an 
institution and is nothing more than good business practice that ensures the survival of 
the system; it builds resilience into the process. As identified previously, this process has 
been developed and instituted in the federal government, private business and collegiate 
organizations to ensure continuity of their identified business processes. However, 
“…because most districts’ plans do not have procedures to ensure the continuity of 
education in the event of extended school closures…both urban and rural, are largely not 
prepared to continue their primary mission of educating students” (Government 
Accountability Office, 2007b, p. 46). It would, therefore, follow suit that such practices 
would be needed, or instituted, in the lower levels of the educational process. Again, 
because these lower levels of the educational system themselves produce a product, the 
future of U.S. society in school children, it would, therefore, be of the utmost importance 
to provide for the continuation of this process; a good business practice.  
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IV. POLICY/STRATEGY ELEMENTS OF K-12 SCHOOL 
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLANS (COOP) 
Upper levels of the academic institutions in the state of Florida have been 
mandated to develop COOPs to maintain the academic environment without disruption. 
The guidance for the development of these COOPs is, in the statute, non-specific. This 
non-specificity lends itself to an inaccurate guidance or policy document development for 
these plans. The identified strategy/policy areas follow the recommended subject 
categories found at the federal and private organizational level that should be covered 
within a COOP. These COOPs have met with success with the business community to 
restore operational capability, and therefore, provide a framework, and example, of what 
a K-12 COOP should mirror.  
While many educational organizations have developed COOPs, many of these fail 
to address, or mention, these categories. Consequently, a developed operational COOP 
may not meet requirements and fail in its application. These particular categories, and the 
suggested information inclusion, are not exclusive, but provide a starting point for COOP 
development at the K-12 level. 
Numerous organizations, at the federal, state and local levels, throughout the 
United States, have developed COOPs to support their organizational process and 
maintain continuity. In a great deal of these cases, the focus was on a continuity of 
business process versus one of continued academic endeavors. When reviewing processes 
from other organizational entities, the similarity of these processes mirror those found in 
schools and could be applied in the academic realm to ensure the continuity of education. 
Therefore, the elements that must be addressed in a COOP can be identified within the 
school academic process and applied with equal focus. In the following elements, 
examples have been created as guidance for inclusion in a K-12 COOP and should be 




COOPs should be a part of the entire school system in its planning for the 
possibility of a disaster, or other threat, that may cause cessation of operations. As was 
previously identified, “[a] Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) ensures that both SEAs 
[state educational agencies] and LEAs [local educational agencies] will have the 
capability to continue essential functions across a wide range of hazards” (United States 
Department of Education, 2007, p. 3).  
At the federal and state levels of government, specific guidance and policy areas 
for COOPs are outlined. As noted at the K-12 level of schools, these areas are not 
covered, nor identified, in any specific guidance. Therefore, the federal and state level 
guidance must be consulted to provide adequate areas for inclusion of those functions 
that affect a school. Federal and state guidance documents provide an excellent starting 
point for the development of COOPs and should be applied to develop viable plans that 
can be employed at every level of the local school system. 
For the purpose of K-12 COOP development, the following areas are addressed to 
provide guidance and policy suggestions for inclusion in the plan. These areas are 
essential function, orders of succession, delegation of authority, continuity facilities, vital 
records management, human capital, test, training and exercise program, devolution of 
control and direction and reconstitution program. These standardized sub-categories are 
normally located within the federal and state guidance documents. 
A.  ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS 
Many definitions can be applied to what true essential functions are and what they 
constitute. One definition for essential functions identifies them as those…job functions 
or task that an individual must be able to perform with or without a reasonable 
accommodation (Essential functions, n.d.). The Continuity Guidance Circular 2 (CGC 2) 
Continuity Guidance for Non-Federal Entities: Mission Essential Function Identification 




…are the limited set of an organization’s functions that must be continued 
throughout or resumed rapidly, following a disruption of normal 
operations. [They] are those organizational missions required to be 
performed to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the 
safety and health of the public, and sustain the industrial and economic 
base, during disruption. (United States Department of Homeland Security, 
2010a, p. A–1)  
A working definition of what constitutes essential functions for school COOPs 
would be those vital educational job functions that ensure educational operations and 
environments are continued and sustained during short or long-term disruption. 
Within each organizational framework, certain functions must continue to ensure 
that the organization continues to operate and remain a viable functioning organization. 
In the case of schools, these functions represent the very school itself. To an outsider 
looking at the school system as a whole, most would say the school building is the main 
operational essential function. This observation is based on the fact that the facility 
represents the very entity of school education in a structural sense. To others, it would be 
those support elements that comprise the administrational framework to include 
superintendents, teachers and administrative support personnel, who represent the non-
physical aspect of the educational system. All these parts of the educational system 
provide a starting point for accessing what constitutes those processes that must be 
continued to ensure the educational foundation remains operational as an institution. 
When reviewing the essential functions of an organization, as outlined in the Continuity 
Guidance Circular 1 (CGC1) Continuity Guidance for Non-Federal Entities: Mission 
Essential Function Identification Process (States, Territories, Tribal, and Local 
Government Jurisdictions and Private Sector Organizations), organizations must 
“…recognize that the entire spectrum of essential functions might not be performed or 
needed in the immediate aftermath of an emergency” (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009a, p. D–1). Only those basic functions that impact the 
educational operation at its most basic level should be considered when assessing the 
program as a whole.  
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An organization should carefully review all of its missions and functions 
before determining those that are essential. Improperly identifying 
functions as “essential” or not identifying as “essential” those functions 
that are, can impair the effectiveness of the entire continuity operations 
program…. (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. 
D–1) 
In the case of a school, the most basic “essential” function would appear to be the 
education of student; in other words, the educational process in its purest form. However, 
without the support of the other aspects of the process, it would not be accomplished. 
Therefore, when reviewing what essential functions truly are, a school should use a 
standard methodology to identify what these are within the school system. A first step in 
this process would be to review what the mission statement of the school contains. By 
reviewing the mission statement, according to the Lessons Learned Information Sharing 
State and Local Government Continuity of Operations Planning: Identifying Essential 
Function, a school can “…gather more information on potential essential function[s]” 
(United States Department of Homeland Security, n.d.c, p. 1). A mission statement 
provides an over-arching goal of what the school is designed to do, and accomplish, and 
provides a point for which the schools has been established. A second step would be to 
consider a legal review of operations within the school. Many school districts “…may be 
required by federal, state, or local law to provide certain critical services to the public….” 
(USDHS, n.d.c, p. 2). Within most school districts, legal counsel is always a part of the 
school board support personnel. The completion of this legal review ensures these 
functions are addressed and integrated into the framework of the COOP. Finally, 
documentation that is presently available, or can be developed, should be reviewed to 
assist in developing a picture of those functions that will assist in the continuance of the 
educational operation. This process can be accomplished through discussion with 
members of the organization, from teachers to organizational support personnel. Current 
organizational documentation by these members, or various other techniques identified 




No specific guidance exists on determining what is and is not an essential 
function within a school system as each school is different in its operation. However, 
functions may be delineated within a set of criteria that may cause inclusion within the 
COOP. These functions are outlined as follows. 
1.  Essential. Those functions that, if disrupted for more than 24 hours, will 
result…in loss of life, confidence in the…[schools system] 
2.  Vital. Functions that will result in any of the above if disrupted for more 
than 72 hours 
3.  Necessary. Functions that must be resumed within two weeks of 
disruption 
4.  Desired. Functions that can be disrupted for more than two weeks but are 
necessary for the normal operations of the…[school]... (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, n.d.c, p. 3)  
Regardless of the methods used, any informational resources that a school has 
will add to the process of identifying those essential processes required to keep a school 
operational before and after a natural or man-made disaster. 
B.  ORDER OF SUCCESSION 
To ensure that COOPs are implemented, prior establishment of those to whom 
authority is granted needs to be codified and agreed to in advance, which is also an 
important aspect of who will be in charge and who has the authority to implement those 
operational measures to ensure the educational process is continued. In line with this 
codification and authorization is the identification of those individuals who will make 
these decisions if the decision makers are incapacitated or are no longer able to execute 
the assigned duties. “A continuity of operations (COOP) plan must include lines of 
succession for key positions to ensure continuity of leadership and the continued support 
for essential functions and critical services” (United States Department of Homeland 
Security, n.d.d, p. 1). This succession is not a simple task of identifying those personnel 
who will be granted the authority to make decisions, but also those personnel who will be 
trained, and prepared, to conduct associated duties if so identified. These individuals 
“…must be closely intertwined with identifying essential functions” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, n.d.d, p. 1).  
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With agencies, such as school systems, this process is an especially critical aspect. 
In a school, an entire administrative staff may become incapacitated and unable to 
continue or direct day-to-day, much less emergency, operations for the school. 
Identification of personnel to fill these positions must be made at a depth as to ensure the 
continued support of the educational process. The succession plan should be three 
employees in depth… (State of Arizona, n.d., p. 10) and these employees should be 
cross-trained in functions under their control or for the position they are assigned to fill. 
In some cases, these individuals may be required to perform additional leadership duties 
in other areas. 
Upon completion of this identification, these individuals should be provided 
access to the necessary guidance and/or equipment to perform their duties. The school 
district itself “…should construct a method by which those in the line of succession will 
have access to information and needed items (computer passwords, calendars, office 
keys, etc.) should they take over leadership responsibilities” (State of Arizona, n.d., p. 
11). This access should be accomplished immediately upon assignment and training of 
the identified individuals and should be a process that is revisited annually to ensure 
currency of all associated materials. This process should also be completed each time a 
member of the staff is promoted, transferred or leaves a current position. 
Additional key issues arise, especially in the case of organizational leadership, 
concerning what these personnel will be authorized to do if so activated. The authority to 
make key emergency decisions during a COOP event must be clear and compliant with 
state and local law. “COOPs must delineate and limit the authority that key COOP 
personnel will have during an event” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 
n.d.b, p. 3). This authority and direction should be codified and supported by school 
board personnel through the promulgation of such authority within the COOP and 
become a complete document for reference, which is further addressed in the delegations 
of authority section. Whatever decision is made in the establishment of the order of 




protected, as vital records and documents just as other documents deemed vital for the 
operation of the school, to ensure the protection of said documents in case of loss of the 
facility or support elements during application of continuity operations. 
A final element in the application of continuity planning is the continuous training 
aspect. When the training is initiated, [d]evelop and provide duties and responsibilities 
briefing[s] to the designated successors of leadership, explain their responsibilities as 
successors and on any provisions for their relocation. Designated successors should 
receive annual refresher briefings (United States Department of Homeland Security, 
2009a, p. E–2). This training and briefings should include all personnel, teachers and 
support personnel during annual breaks in the school year to make them aware of these 
responsibilities and what actions may cause the application of such measures. 
C.  DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY 
Numerous definitions of what constitutes delegation authority abound in 
organizations in the academic realm, business community and governmental agencies. 
Schools, because of their decentralized nature, normally operate with a central office 
containing the superintendent and individual schools with their respective principals. 
Thus, the following definition is provided as an overall facilitative definition for 
exploration. Within the school district, it is the “[i]dentification, by position, of the 
authorities for making policy determinations and decisions [at]…other organizational 
locations” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. P–2). As 
previously discussed in the orders of succession, the depth of delegation of authority 
should be to a point to ensure that the continuity of operations of the educational process 
is not interrupted for any length of time. The individuals chosen for such positions should 
be annually trained and/or briefed to ensure they are cognizant of their responsibilities to 
perform those leadership positions. This authority should be documented “…in 
advance…[by] legal authority…to make key policy decisions during a continuity 
situation[s]” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. F–1). 
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When possible, specific guidance should be developed as to what authority is 
implied to the individual, which should become part of the overall document and provide 
what can be done and what cannot be done when this delegation is implemented. In other 
words, “…the limits of authority and accountability” (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009a, p. F–1). When leadership individuals are identified for 
specific positions, it must also be asked if they are willing to accept this responsibility. 
As previously stated, trainings and briefings in regards to the duties and responsibilities 
of the delegation of authority process should be completed to ensure the identified 
personnel are cognizant of, and prepared to assume, this responsibility. This agreement to 
accept responsibility, promulgated by legal authorities, and training/briefings completed 
should be contained in the COOP document as a whole.  
D.  CONTINUITY FACILITIES 
School buildings will always be regarded as permanent facilities, and thus, need 
special consideration of their construction and use. Due to the unique characteristics of 
the state of Florida, and its susceptibility to hurricanes and various other natural disasters, 
the chance that a school facility will be rendered useless is always a possibility, which is 
the key to alternate facility planning. To ensure the continued educational operations of a 
facility, alternate locations for classrooms, as well as educational support functions, need 
to be identified in advance. This two-fold process involves not only considering a 
location to which individuals, because of damage or other issues, must relocate, but also 
the current location now occupied on a daily basis. “Daily operational facilities should be 
evaluated for hardness in accordance with applicable standards, and should be consider 
[sic] the ability to withstand natural disasters and utility failures and to protect people 
who need to shelter-in-place” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. 
G–1). This resilience consideration is an added aspect of the continuity operational 
environment and could assist in the continued operation of the educational process as a 





alone will not ensure continued educational operations. Herein lies the second part of the 
process to locate, procure and establish facilities that will provide this operational 
capability. 
Alternate facilities, or locations, can be defined as those facilities “…where an 
agency performs essential functions” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 
n.d.a, p. 1). For the purpose of exploration, alternate facilities or locations, as they 
concern themselves with the school environment, are those that in the planned or 
unplanned event, current educational operations could be reestablished within in a 
specified time frame. In a given situation, these normally established timeframes are 
within 12 hours of the disaster. These operations would be required to operate for a 
minimum of 30 days or more, or until the educational operational environment can be 
reestablished. In some cases, it may take years for a facility to recover its original 
operational infrastructure. This standard should be a baseline requirement for all alternate 
facility considerations and used in the planning process for obtainment of alternate 
facilities. 
When obtaining alternate facilities, it is suggested that existing school facilities 
located in the area of the disaster be considered first for use. If a municipality or school 
district has other undamaged schools, these facilities can quickly be modified to accept 
the students from other schools. A second consideration may involve the use of facilities 
already performing other educational duties that would include vocational and technical 
education systems with already established classrooms and mediums for the delivery of 
classroom instruction. Other local colleges or universities also provide this ability if they 
are undamaged by the local incident. A third consideration would be the use of other 
government facilities located within the disaster area if they are not being used for 
disaster operations. Places, such as meeting facilities, agricultural facilities and other 
venues, may be considered for such purposes. These locations, in most cases, will already 
have the infrastructure in place to support operations. A final option may involve support 
from local commercial real estate offices within the area. While not always the case, 
facilities that once housed manufacturing or retail sales operations could support school 
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operational continuance. These facilities would take a minimum of operational 
employment to bring them to a full operational capacity and can also serve as a financial 
incentive for the owners of such property as a steady financial income can be provided 
for the facility versus letting the facility remain empty and idle.  
The first step in the process of determining alternate facilities is to consider what 
is presently being used. If the student population numbers 1,000, it would not assist in 
developing alternate facilities that would not accommodate, or support, current 
requirements in an equal, if not greater, capacity. This lack of support or accommodation 
may be a limiting factor within the jurisdiction if no facilities exist that could provide this 
surge capacity or, because of other identified issues, would preclude the use of such 
facilities.  
When determining the availability of alternate facilities, numerous considerations 
beyond what has already been mentioned need to be explored, which is especially true if 
the use of these alternate facilities is expected to reach beyond the 30-day timeframe. The 
first considerations would be the location of the permanently fixed or temporary location. 
Before considering such locations, the school leadership, in concert with safety and 
security personnel “…should conduct an all-hazards risk assessment for all continuity 
facilities” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. G–3). If alternate 
facilities are located in an area in which flooding has occurred before or in an area that 
may contain hazardous materials or other inherent dangers, a similar situation could 
occur in the future. , These facilities, because of these issues, may not be a viable option 
or may not be available for future use.  
In extreme cases in which facilities may need to be upgraded to meet 
requirements of the school operations themselves, consideration will have to be given to 
these facilities and the cost of such upgrades or enhancements to make these facilities 
viable options. These improvements may be a decision that coincides with other issues in 
a cost versus benefit option. The upgrade requirements may cause cost to be so high that 
the option for use of the facility may have to be negated. 
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A second consideration involves support logistics for the facility and personnel 
themselves. Schools become small cities during the school year and provide all the 
amenities that support the educational environment. In the case of the school itself, food 
and transportation services, water, and other services are located within the confines of 
the campus. When an incident occurs that causes the disruption of these services, plans 
must be in place to ensure these functions continue unabated. In selecting locations to 
continue the educational process, sites should be located that “…provide the alternate site 
with power, telecommunications services, and Internet access…” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. G–4), as well as those needs that the 
previous facility provided. While these may not need to be part of the structure itself, 
these issues need to be addressed before the facility, as a whole, is considered. These 
services, just as the facility itself, are support elements that cause the operation to 
continue and to function.  
Food service is a major item in the planning of continuity operations and feeding 
areas are an integral part of the physical infrastructure. In most cases, schools will have 
pre-existing contracts for providing feeding operations or have other contracts in place 
with governmental food stocks for the supply of feeding commodities. In reviewing 
contracts, agreements should be reviewed that provide for feeding in case the facility is 
rendered unusable. These alternatives may include mobile feeding stations or other 
methods to provide meals in a location other than the school campus itself. In 
determining requirements for feeding, the present facility and its operation would provide 
the baseline operating picture. 
A third consideration would be the availability of electrical power at the alternate 
facility or near the area under review. Electrical power must be seen as a separate, or 
disconnected, issue from the school facility. In the event of a major disaster, schools will 
not be a priority for the reestablishment of power; hospitals and other emergency service 
will. If possible, alternate facilities located near an area, such as these, may fall within the 




establishment of power requirements. While an extreme case, this option must be 
considered to provide a faster operational tempo to bring the educational process back on 
line. Again, this option is preferred but may not be possible to obtain.  
One option that must be reviewed is the advent of emergency generator power or 
the ability to have it installed. Facilities should be examined to see if first, emergency 
power is available, and second, if it is possible to have emergency power tied into the 
existing facility in the form of generators. School officials, in searching for such a 
facility, “…should pre-identify…facilities that require generators to continue operating 
during power outages. [School officials] should work with those facilities to ensure the 
installation of generators prior to the next emergency” (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, n.d.e, p. 1). A second option may involve the placement of transfer 
switches at such facilities to preclude the storage of such generators at these sites. During 
a disaster, generators are always a premium, and may be needed elsewhere, which would 
prevent a stationary generator from being tied to one or two facilities. If needed, 
generators of the appropriate size may be brought onto the facility grounds and employed 
within a small timeframe if the transfer switches are already installed. When considering 
generator power, thought must be given to the power needs of the facility as a whole and 
those power requirements that may be anticipated as more requirements are put on the 
system. The establishment of preexisting contracts for the supply of such generators must 
be considered as part of the overall planning for such an operation. As previously 
mentioned, generators will become a scarce commodity during an emergency situation 
and their obtainment may be made difficult or, in more cases than not, completely 
impossible. 
A fourth consideration involves hygiene facilities located within the alternate 
facility. Adequate facilities should be located in the alternate location to provide sewer 
and other water supply concerns. Schools are a large consumer of these types of services 
and must be part of the overall plan when reviewing a particular facility or facilities.  
Heating and cooling capabilities of the facility should be major concerns. If the 
disaster occurs during a major hot or cold season, adequate heating and cooling 
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requirements will be an issue for the health and well-being of students and staff. If a 
facility lacks either of these, the building may be rendered unusable for the placement of 
students or personnel. 
A fifth consideration when reviewing alternate facilities is the availability of 
communications, which can range from simple telephone connectivity to in-house radio 
communications operations. Without the ability to communicate with operations outside 
of the facility, coordination of daily operation would be severely hindered or negated 
totally. Communications to include telephone, fax and two-way radio will all be 
considerations in choosing the proper alternate facility. The baseline consideration in 
communication is that it “…should be sufficient to enable performance of all essential 
business functions” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. G–4). 
Again, an adequate baseline application of the previous facility should be explored when 
considering other facilities for their use. 
One area of special concern should be issues involving those individuals covered 
under the regulation dealing with students with disabilities. While schools, during normal 
operations, are required to meet the established guidance for those with disabilities, 
students with disabilities would present a unique, and somewhat difficult, challenge to 
schools involving alternate facilities. When obtaining alternate facilities, these issues 
must be addressed for not only ensuring identified students with disabilities are able to 
continue the educational process, but also to ensure the established laws both at the 
federal and state level are followed and enforced. 
Finally, Memorandums of Understanding (MOU)/Memorandums of Agreement 
(MOA) should be in place to expedite the movement process to the alternate facility. 
With MOU/MOAs pre-established with vendors, suppliers and facility owners, issues 
previously identified can be dealt with and the process for movement and acquisition can 
be fast-tracked to ensure continuity of the educational process. MOUs/MOAs provide a 
legal basis and planning tool to ensure services are agreed upon and that those items 
needed will be supplied. 
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In acquiring alternate facilities for the school district, plans or guidance need to be 
established for a continual review of those facilities that have been selected. In the case of 
facilities, such as those owned or operated by private entities, they may become 
unavailable due to resale. Other issues identified may change as well. Vendors that 
supply food, power or other commodities may cease to provide these services or go out of 
business. On at least a yearly basis, alternate facilities locations should be reevaluated for 
continued applicability. 
E.  CONTINUITY COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications during an event goes far beyond just the basic need to 
communicate. For the school itself, it involves an entire infrastructure’s ability to not 
only communicate, but also present educational material in a format that supports the 
educational mission. For schools to educate, they must communicate. “[A 
schools]…ability to execute its essential…[educational] functions at its primary facility 
and at its alternate or other continuity facilities…and act under all-hazards conditions, 
depend upon the availability of effective communications systems” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. H–1). These systems include internally, the 
ability of school administration to coordinate the daily-required operations of the school 
system. Externally, this ability includes the assurance that vital services and statutorily 
required instruction is completed. When viewing each of the processes, most, if not all, of 
the processes need to be performed simultaneously. 
When considering functions of a viable communications continuity forum, five 
specific areas should be addressed to ensure that educational processes continue. If these 
five components are not part of the overall continuity concept, then the academic portion 
of the operation will, in more cases than not, fail in applicability. The five areas normally 
considered are: “(1) continuation of learning method…, (2) instructor readiness, (3) 




The continuation of the learning method concerns through which type of medium 
the instruction will be delivered. In years past, the emergence of 16 MM and stripfilm 
form presentation gave way to VHS and Beta formats. As technology became more 
available, these standard formats gave way to computer and DVD productions that 
provided more interaction with the system versus a one way pedagogical application. 
Today, social media has become cutting edge in the presentation of material and provides 
an excellent platform for the presentation of instruction through personal media devices. 
However, learning does not take place in a vacuum and must be planned well in advance. 
“Online learning and continuity of learning is more than just providing curriculum in an 
online format. It involves the planning, training and management of delivery of 
instruction over a new technologically enabled delivery model” (Continuity of Learning, 
n.d.). 
Textbooks would be another concern for students if the facility were lost. It 
cannot always be assumed that students will have textbooks available or that they can be 
replaced quickly. With the advent of books via electronic means, this could provide a 
short or long-term solution to obtaining textbooks for completion of the class. In a 
disaster, schools should consider the purchase of electronic systems, such as iPads or 
eBooks, or other means, and provide students with these systems. The download of 
textbooks for class would be made via pre-established accounts with book suppliers that 
would (1) provide a social medium through which students could connect to complete 
their instruction, and (2) provide the ability to establish an account to provide the books 
to students. With the financial constraints placed on schools today, these systems would 
seem value-added assets, as well as a fiscally viable option to provide instruction. 
Regardless of the medium chosen, a range of technologies abounds and provides a 
virtual classroom setting that can deliver a learning environment for the student. These 
technologies also provide a method of instruction through which educators may maintain 
baseline educational functions if the facility were rendered unusable. 
A second area that must be reviewed prior to the implementation of a specific 
type of medium involves the readiness of teachers and instructors to be able to teach in 
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these virtual classrooms. As previously identified, it takes training and planning for this 
to occur. As teachers have become comfortable with the latest in technology, this process 
has become easier to achieve and should be emphasized with current and future teacher 
appointments. For teachers, the development of on-line curriculum should be completed 
as in-class lessons are developed. Lesson plans do not change much over the years unless 
new information is discovered or legal requirements cause this change to occur. 
Therefore, each teacher can prepare lesson plans in advance to include that portion that 
can be presented on line. This preparation would also provide the ability for teachers to 
retrieve lesson-planning materials in case of data loss or if a paper-based system of the 
planning were destroyed because of a natural or man-made disaster. 
An additional concern in presenting lessons in a virtual classroom is the readiness 
of the teachers to operate within this medium of presentation. As new teachers are placed 
in positions, it does become less likely that they will not be “technically advantaged,” but 
this concern must be addressed in the planning of the lesson presentation. If teachers are 
not trained in the nuances of the technological advances of the day then the lessons may 
not be able to be presented. The same can be said in the virtual world of on-line textbooks 
for the course. 
A third concern is student readiness to learn in this type of environment. Students 
today have more skill in the virtual world than anyone, with others trying to catch up, 
which includes teachers and other educators. However, this readiness may not always 
equate to learning in this type of classroom setting. If students are issued the means to 
learn, and are able to practice in this type of environment, then the process applicability 
will be enhanced if the school becomes inoperable. If throughout the year students are 
allowed, or presented, a course in the on-line format, they gain the valuable skills 
necessary for the learning process to occur if the classroom is available or not. Again, a 
value-added aspect is provided when students are sick or unable to attend class for any 
number of various reasons. They do not miss valuable class time and are able to continue 
their lessons and instruction in-line, and on-line, with their fellow classmates. 
 35 
 
A fourth consideration involves the infrastructure support for the completion of 
the educational process. As previously stated, the use of electronic educational means 
could involve the issuance of systems to, at the very least, support issuance of textbook 
and lesson plan materials. Other means, such as local television broadcast, or 
development of DVD programs, could assist in the continuance of the learning process. 
This process could be further enhanced using off-sites methods of instruction. “For 
example, the New York City Department of Education has created a “learn at home” 
Web site, complete with downloadable PDF files listing activities in all subjects for 
students in pre-K through grade 12” (United States Department of Education, n.d.). 
Prior to this process being accomplished, the infrastructure must be in place to 
provide the means to do so. While no one medium of instruction is suggested over the 
other, methods would need to be discussed with the district current school and state 
boards of education to determine what the proper means of education would entail. 
Regardless of the methods chosen, a word of caution must be addressed in the 
interoperability of all associated systems, which would be especially a concern if plans 
exist to use other facilities in the area or facilities that may be located outside of the local 
disaster area. If systems are not compatible then the entire endeavor may not be a viable 
option. 
A final consideration would involve the institutional policies of the state board of 
education, as well as the local board of education. An all-encompassing set of guidelines 
must be established at the state and local levels to embrace this form of technology and 
learning environment. Without this support, and these guidelines, the entire process 
would not be applied and a large section of the continuity function could be hampered or 
non-existent. 
In the case of providing continuing educational platforms, these new educational 
mediums provide a large number of venues to continue teaching unabated because of a 




F.  VITAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT 
Schools must have the ability to maintain school vital information for the 
continuity of operations following a disaster; this issue should be a process built into the 
everyday function of the school administration operation. By making this a part of normal 
day-to-day procedures, operational continuance is eased if the school is no longer able to 
function at its present location. For the purpose of the school and its administrative 
operations, the term vital records is all “…information systems and application, 
electronic and hardcopy documents, references, and records needed to support essential 
functions during a continuity situation” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 
2009a, p. I–1). Due to the unique attributes of each school administration, not to mention 
each school unto itself, these types of records will need to be identified. Additionally, 
each of these types of vital records may require different levels of protection to ensure 
that personal, especially medical, information is neither lost, nor compromised, as a result 
of this disaster. Normally, vital records fall into two distinct categories and should be 
considered the starting point for decisions regarding what records are vital and which 
ones are not. The first category involves those “…records and databases essential to the 
continued functioning or the reconstitution of an organization during and after a 
continuity event” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. I–1). These 
types of records could include any documentation mentioned previously, such as plans 
that outline the procedures that dictate operations under the COOP as a whole, or any 
legal or administrative operational guidance that outlines administrative hierarchy. 
The second category consists of records that are “…critical to carrying out an 
organization’s essential legal and financial functions, and vital to the protection of legal 
and financial rights of individuals who are directly affected by that organization’s 
activities” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. I–1). These types 
of records could include any type of information that addresses financial operations of 
both the school, as well as the employees. Other records to consider would include 
MOUs/MOAs that outline what services will be provided on a day-to-day basis, as well 
as during an emergency. A key record to keep is that of current resources and insurance 
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policies that cover the school or personnel assigned. These records will be key 
information components when reconstitution operations are implemented and the 
replacement of facilities and equipment is required. The list of information necessary to 
be contained within these two specific categories will differ with each school and school 
district. Each school district should take the appropriate time to ascertain what key 
records are of primary importance from both the school district level down to the lowest 
operational point to ensure that school operations can be successfully continued at other 
locations. 
One of the most important areas to review is what method or form these types of 
records will be stored in or on what they should be stored. In the past number of years, 
numerous storage methods have reached a point at which data storage has become more 
advanced and extremely portable. A belief still exists that records should be stored in a 
paper-based method, which still appeals to many operational and organizational 
structures. However, this belief must now be considered a back up as these paper-based 
storage methods can result in the loss of vital data and information from natural and man-
made disasters. In some cases, the storage of such vital records may add to the possibility 
of such an incident happening due to fire or the increase of chances of this occurring. An 
additional storage method, but with a reduced danger, is the storage of vital records on 
the hard drives of computers. Again, this method would present a possibility for the loss 
of records in case of a natural or man-made disaster. Computer data can be lost via 
computer viruses or other corruption programs and may not be recoverable. Additionally, 
in the case of most schools, computers are normally desktop systems and are semi-
permanent fixtures not able to be moved to a new location. This possibility leaves the 
data on the hard drive at the facility and provides no access to the data once the facility is 
abandoned or made inoperable, which also provides for the susceptibility of loss of all 
records contained on the computer as a whole. 
New storage systems have been developed that on the one hand provide storage 
capability in a small size and provide an extreme amount of portability in case the facility 
has to be abandoned and established in another location. Flash drives, also known as 
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thumb and jump drives, provide an extreme amount of storage space for the placement of 
vital records in a storage operational mode. These systems are extremely portable and 
provide the opportunity for schools to store vital records in many different places around 
the school district and allow for a level of physical security of records that would not be 
afforded to computer hard drives or paper-based records. These systems also provide the 
unique portability concept to be able to, in an expedited manner, reestablish operational 
and administrative functions at an entirely new alternate facility. By having multiple 
copies of these drives stored at other location within the school district, added access and 
redundancy, is provided in a primary, secondary and tertiary fashion. Each year, because 
flash drives are extremely cost efficient, the drives can be replaced at each location for a 
minimum of cost. The drives previously used would be maintained to provide backup 
documentation and provide a historical transition of information for future reference. 
A second system provides an even better alternative for the maintenance of 
documentation and provides for a more secure documentation repository. With the new 
advent of “cloud computing,” databases are maintained off site and on protected servers 
that may be accessed off site by any authorized individual. “Cloud computing provides 
computation, software, data access, and storage services that do not require end-user 
knowledge of the physical location and configuration of the system that delivers the 
service” (Cloud Computing, n.d.). By using this “cloud computing” method, numerous 
issues can be addressed at once and provide one of the most secure avenues of 
documentation for the continuity of the operational framework of the school facility. 
Cloud computing harkens back to the beginning of the computer age with mainframe 
computer systems accessed by an offsite access point. These types of mainframes solve 
numerous problems for access, security and continuity efforts. Each of the 
aforementioned documents needed to maintain operations of the school district could be 
stored within these “clouds” and accessed upon initiation of the COOP at the alternate 
site. These clouds would also include a storage area for each of the teachers to place 
lesson plans and other associated support materials for continuance of the educational 
process as a whole. Once Internet connectivity is established, records, MOUs/MOAs and 
other vital documents can be down loaded and printed. The added option of this type of 
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system is the everyday maintenance of the information itself. By making the updating of 
these records a normal day-to-day operational process, the ease of access and the speed of 
operational tempo for the alternate facility can be exponentially increased.  
G.  HUMAN CAPITAL 
In a COOP, the requirement to continue operations goes far beyond the physical 
structures or other infrastructure considerations. Much like the requirement of the 
structure itself, support services, such as electrical power, food operations and equipment 
to provide the educational continuation, human capital, better known as people, must be a 
major consideration. Without the identification of those to complete the associated 
functions previously mentioned, the entire continuity endeavor will fail. “Organizations 
should establish criteria for identifying critical employees” (Lady, 2011, p. 8). The 
criteria should identify those individuals first tied to the completion of those essential 
functions to make the educational operation function to the same level it did prior to the 
succession of operations. Secondly, those individuals who support other operations, as 
well as the previously mention individuals critical to daily functions, should be identified 
as well. It should also be recognized that in the case of “...a physical or pandemic 
disaster…some critical employees…[will] be unavailable” (Lady, 2011, p. 8).  
When identifying personnel critical to the operation of the school environment, 
consideration must be given to the possibility that the school system as a whole may 
suffer from numerous hazards that have in the past affected its operation. These hazards 
will be a consideration of those issues discovered in the disaster intelligence section of 
the COOP plan and will have a large input on the operational application of the COOP as 
a whole. Due to the need for a multi-issue approach to this possibility, and other 
functions of the plan, there is a: 
…need for organizations to be prepared for all-hazards emergencies and 
disasters,…[and the] organization should ensure that its human capital 
strategies for the continuity staff are adaptable to changing circumstances 
and a variety of emergencies, and that these strategies and procedures are 
regularly reviewed and updated as appropriate,…. (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. J–1) 
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Six areas should be addressed when developing human capital resources for a 
school COOP. The first step is schools “…should develop and implement a process to 
identify, document, communicate with and train continuity personnel” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. J–1). No established criteria exist for the 
selection of these individuals as many differences are based on legal and governmental 
frameworks for schools across many of the school districts. However, based on the 
individual district mission requirements, basic criteria will need to be established to 
provide baseline information that will be communicated to those individuals fulfilling 
these mission essential positions. Once identification is completed, documentation of 
those individuals is required to promulgate the requirements established for these 
positions formally, which provides the legal basis for those individuals to act in the 
identified positions, as well as the legal framework for identified individuals to operate. 
These documents also provide a tactile form to communicate responsibilities to those 
performing these duties. In many cases, these individuals perform their duties on a 
recurring basis everyday and no thought is given to the situation ever changing. However, 
during a disaster, or other disruption, the everyday operation will transform in an instant 
to an entirely new set of completely unexpected paradigms and parameters. 
The final operational piece of this first step is the training of personnel within 
each of their continuity functions. It is not enough that an individual be identified and 
then expected to perform. As previously stated, the routine daily operation can be 
transformed in an instant from normal to chaotic and individuals must be knowledgeable 
of their operational requirements to be effective. It is imperative that “…continuity 
personnel should understand their roles and responsibilities and participate in their 
organization’s continuity TT&E [test, training and exercise] program” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. J–2). When training personnel, the 
operation of cross training individuals should be implemented to assist in the “three-
deep” concept of school operations. Cross training should be standard operating 
procedure (SOP) if for no other reason than people take vacations, get sick, retire, or quit 
for any number of reasons (Glenn, 2011, p. 14). This cross training has the effect of not 
only providing an added operational enhancement, but also provides for increased worker 
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confidence and trust in the system as a whole. This intrinsic process can provide a value-
added aspect to the entire school system as a whole regardless of disaster functions. The 
training should, at a minimum, be completed annually to ensure that those identified are 
current in their training and fully understand their roles in the COOP process. This annual 
review would at the same time identify any changes in personnel due to position 
realignment, retirement or termination. 
The second step of the process is schools “…should provide guidance to 
continuity personnel on individual preparedness measures that they should take to ensure 
response to a continuity event” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, 
p. J–2). Human nature dictates that an individual’s own survival is paramount as is the 
survival of those held closest. If those individuals who will fulfill those continuity 
operations are unavailable because of their own personnel needs, again, the response of 
the COOP as a whole will be negated. By providing pertinent guidance on ways for 
individuals to protect themselves and their families, as well as their own property, their 
ability to report and perform at a high level during the continuity operations is enhanced, 
which is indicative of first responders as well in the preparation of their families for a 
natural or man-made disaster. Specific guidance, along with available information 
resources and training, should be part of the program as a whole. Again, the value-added 
aspect and a more positive response force when continuity operations are needed will be 
provided. 
The third step of the process is schools “…should implement a process to 
communicate the organization’s operating status with all staff” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. J–2). In the event of a disaster, natural or 
man-made, communications may be limited, and in extreme cases, lost completely. This 
communication process or system should envision the loss of multiple systems in 
response to a disaster and should include triple redundancy. Due to an over reliance of 
systems, such as landline telephones, communication in and out of the school system as a 
whole may be lost. Just as power to a facility is lost due to the loss of the infrastructure 
that structurally support power lines, phone systems will also fail if the disaster is 
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widespread. The same could be said of cell phone systems. In many cases, landline fiber 
optic cables between operational towers carry cell phone calls. If this system is corrupted, 
or disrupted, no transfer of the data between the towers can occur. Even if this does not 
happen, towers may be damaged to a point as to make them inoperable, or may be 
destroyed, which could take months to replace. Pre-established communication methods 
must be developed to assist those responding to locate where they should report to 
complete their continuity responsibilities and be provided information on what they 
should do. “Pre-planned coordinated communication strategies should include both 
traditional (e.g., phone lines, cell phones) and nontraditional (e.g., ham radios) 
communication mechanisms and equipment” (United States Department of Education, 
2007, p. 6). 
The fourth step of the process is schools “…should implement a process to 
contact and account for all staff in the event of an emergency” (United States Department 
of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. J–2). As previously stated, communication methods 
should be triple redundant in case primary or secondary systems are unavailable for use, 
which could be accomplished in any number of ways through many different 
organizations. One such method would to be to establish MOU/MOAs with other school 
districts in neighboring counties or counties outside the affected area. Through these 
school districts, an affected school district would be able to, within 12–24 hours, locate 
and establish communication with continuity personnel to assist in keeping the entire 
staff abreast of the situation. These communications could be conducted by either 
establishing a toll free telephone number or a website that would allow employees to 
notify the organization of their status (United States Department of Homeland Security, 
2009a, p. J–2). This would be predicated on numerous communication possibilities, and 
thus, requiring the triple redundancy of these systems to provide this information. 
To add to the robustness of the systems for contacting individuals, identifying 
these persons prior to an incident in the COOP would value-add to the entire 
communication process. Through the development of phone trees or call down rosters, 
personnel could be both called upon to respond and also be contacted as to their present 
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physical status and/or location predicated on the operational integrity of the 
communication system and whether it survived the initial disaster and was in working 
order. Regardless of the situation, any system devised by the school system that will 
enhance the response and accounting of personnel will improve the overall operational 
environment.  
The fifth step of the process is schools “…should identify a human capital liaison-
a continuity coordinator or continuity manager-to work with the organization’s human 
resources and emergency planning staff when developing the organization’s emergency 
plans” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. J–3). This step is an 
important aspect from not only a legal perspective, as many school personnel are 
represented and supported by unions, but also to ensure that plans once developed and 
deployed are kept current, which is especially true when a school is large and has any 
number of schools within its functional responsibility. A second, and just as important 
issue, is ensuring documentation of training needs and training completion are kept 
current. COOPs are not static entities, but living and breathing documents that will only 
see their significance if and when deployed in an operational event. Even more critical is 
when they, because of lack of maintenance, fail, which results in the loss of educational 
personnel and ability. 
By identifying a specific person to perform the duties of a human capital liaison, 
an individual is thus centrally tasked to coordinate all the activities within this area. This 
tasking provides a focal point to ensure that when plans are developed, they mesh as 
seamlessly as possible with the COOP process as a whole. In some cases, plans 
developed by one agency, or in this case, a particular school organization, may be in 
diametrical opposition of legal requirements or may not be possible to implement because 
they differ in application. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to identify that 
individual who will be able to provide all aspects involved within the human element as 
early as possible in the process to compliment the development of the COOP and other 




The sixth and final step of the process is schools “…should implement a process 
to communicate their human capital guidance for emergencies (pay, leave, staffing and 
other human resources flexibilities) to managers and make staff aware of that guidance in 
an effort to help agencies continue essential functions during an emergency” (United 
States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. J–3). This process could be a simple 
matter of including guidance within the employee handbook. When personnel are hired, 
such guidance could be issued as part of their overall informational package and be 
briefed on its contents. The new employee would sign a statement acknowledging receipt 
of said guidance in accordance with their new hire orientation. While this does not 
provide a 100% guarantee that the employee will read the information, it does provide a 
starting point for the initial understanding of items, such as “…pay, leave, work 
scheduling, benefits, telework, hiring, etc., authorities and flexibilities” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. J–3). Within this informational guidance, 
the explanation of the COOP concept and its possible part in its implementation during an 
emergency could be given. 
As previously mentioned, no guarantee exists that the employee will read the 
material provided. Herein lies the opportunity for further reinforcement during annual 
training meetings prior to school commencement. Through in-service training sessions or 
yearly training classes for personnel, an explanation of the COOP and its operational 
frame, especially the school personnel’s part in the process, could be explained. Making 
each member of the school district responsible for remaining current on maintenance 
could be stressed to ensure the latest and most current information available is 
maintained. Any change in procedure or updated material could be made with inserts 
supplied at the meeting or provided through other means to ensure that all materials are 
maintained to the level of the latest information, which would be especially true if the 
threat environment were subject to fluid change and material could become outdated 
quite frequently. 
Additional systems, such as the school district website, can assist in maintaining 
currency of material. By placing guidance on the website, near real time information can 
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be displayed and provided to all personnel concerning the application of the COOP and 
provide the latest information on updates and changes, as well as reduce the need for 
constantly meeting with individuals to update informational changes. 
H.  TEST, TRAINING AND EXERCISE PROGRAM  
For a COOP to remain viable, and current, a system must be in place to ensure 
those items identified in the plan will be able to be completed when the COOP is 
activated, which is the very essence of the TT&E program of the COOP. The TT&E 
process is one designed “…to ensure that an agency’s continuity plan is capable of 
supporting the continued execution of the agency’s essential function throughout the 
duration of a continuity situation” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 
2010b, p. A–6). Exercising and testing the COOP should not be viewed as just a 
requirement to be accomplished because of statutorily mandated issues, but should be 
looked upon as an opportunity to apply the design of the plan and be able to ascertain its 
weak points and as a process for improvement. “TT&E can test the effectiveness of 
COOP plans and ensure efficient COOP plan implementation” (United States Department 
of Homeland Security, n.d.f, p. 1). The TT&E program goes far beyond just ascertaining 
if the plan works in a given situation; it provides a unique opportunity for persons within 
the organization to work together in the process; a key asset during actual activation. 
“Training familiarizes continuity personnel with their roles and responsibilities in support 
of the performance of an organization’s essential functions during a continuity event” 
(United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. K–1). Through this process, 
personnel gain an understanding of the process and how they fit into its framework. An 
added benefit of such a program is that it familiarizes individuals with the equipment they 
may be required to deploy and provides the opportunity to test the equipment to ensure it 
is operating properly and is serviceable, which increases confidence in those operating 
the equipment and has an effect on the morale of those within the organization. These 
benefits are all value-added aspects of the TT&E program.  
“Testing ensures that equipment and procedures are maintained in a constant state 
of readiness to support continuity activation and operations” (United States Department 
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of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. K–1). Through a robust testing protocol, those 
procedures and equipment can be maintained at a high state of readiness. As has been 
previously identified and suggested, this operation should be continuous as the threat 
from natural and man-made disasters change. Testing of all identified systems within the 
COOP should be, at the very least, tested on a yearly basis. In some cases, depending on 
the ability of the organization, some parts of the COOP should be tested quarterly, which 
may be necessary as new equipment becomes available, people retire or are moved to 
another position. Also, because of changing legal requirements, a review of procedures 
and processes may be required each quarter with updates being communicated to 
members involved in the COOP operation. 
The testing requirement may also extend beyond the school physical grounds as 
well, which will be especially important as it concerns alternate facilities that will 
possibly be used. Each facility should be tested for compliance and usability at least 
annually to include activation of MOU/MOAs to ensure the building will provide the 
operational environment required to support the continuance of the educational process, 
as well as all associated support functions for provision of power, communications and 
food services in addition to other identified needs.  
“Training familiarizes continuity personnel with their procedures, tasks, roles, and 
responsibilities in executing…[the schools] essential functions in a continuity 
environment” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. K–2). The 
training should be considered in phases to assure a 100% application for personnel 
assigned not only to those positions that involve the COOP itself, but also the members of 
the entire schools system so that they can become familiar with the process as a whole. 
This training provides redundancy of the system. For initial employment of any 
individual within the school system, training should be accomplished to provide an 
overall view of the requirements of COOP operations. If the new employee is to be 
assigned certain duties within the activation of the COOP, then this identified 
requirement should be provided through this initial training opportunity. If a newly 
identified individual is a long-time employee, this training will involve more in-depth 
 47 
 
familiarization of the specific role within the COOP operation. However, a brief 
overview of the entire COOP picture would be advisable to provide clarification of the 
process in its entirety. Finally, at least on an annual basis, training should be provided to 
all personnel, even to those not directly involved in the COOP operational framework. 
This process serves to provide buy-in from all personnel in the school and provides 
familiarity with the process as a whole. By doing so, support of other personnel who may, 
in an emergency, have to fill positions or perform task not previously identified in the 
basic outline of the plans is increased. 
When all training has been completed, this information should be captured to the 
extent possible as established by current school district guidelines or those outlined 
within the COOP itself. As part of the training program, “the…[school] should document 
the training conducted, the date of training, those completing the training, and by whom” 
(United States Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. K–2). By memorializing this 
training, numerous documentation issues are completed that should be treated as vital 
records when considering important records. 
First, providing training documents, for legal review, that it has been completed 
and the utmost concern has been addressed for the school and personnel. Documentation 
would thus be provided that the process was well conceived prior to the implementation 
of the COOP and that all precautions taken to ensure the safety, security and educational 
process for the school. This documentation may be used later for any legal issues and 
questions that may arise concerning implementation of the COOP. Secondly, by 
documenting the completion of COOP training within the school system, the individual 
identified is therefore responsible for maintaining that training level and for performing 
the required duties if the COOP were implemented. A formal notification to the 
individual of this responsibility is then provided, as well as the opportunity for that 
individual to identify any weaknesses in the training provided for the position. If 
weaknesses are identified during this time, they can be corrected and noted within the 
training documentation. Finally, documentation can assist in determining what further 
training may be needed to accomplish the COOP operation. By involving school 
 48 
 
personnel in the process, “out-of-the-box” thinking is provided that may detect other 
areas that need to be considered for inclusion when implementing a full COOP program. 
Many times those heavily involved in the development of the plan miss the subtle 
nuances of other areas that others outside the process have addressed in the past. Those 
completing certain tasks know more about how the process works than those directing the 
tasks. 
Plans are excellent outlines to possess when determining what direction an 
organization needs to travel, which is especially true when disaster strikes. However, 
without a comprehensive exercise program to test such plans, it becomes useless in their 
practical application. In completing a continuity exercise, the main issue is “…evaluating 
capabilities or an element of a capability…in a simulated situation” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. K–2). When a disaster strikes, the plan is no 
longer a conceptual issue developed to meet the threat, but must be that operational 
application to bring all the elements together to ensure continual operation of the 
educational framework. If the plan has not been exercised prior to this time, the 
possibility of failure is great and the plan becomes nothing but a concept with 
applicability issues. 
I.  DEVOLUTION OF CONTROL AND DIRECTION  
The devolution of control and direction is the very essence of the COOP in its 
basic application. The process serves two functions in that it is designed to outline 
“…how an organization will identify and transfer essential functions and/or leadership 
authorities away from the primary facility or facilities, and to a location that offers a safe 
and secure environment in which essential function can be performed” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009a, p. L–1). The process will involve all the 
elements of the alternate facilities, their activations and any logistic concerns that may 
arise that necessitate the need to move.  
The second function addresses steps required if the primary, secondary or tertiary 
facilities are not available for occupation. If the incident, whether man-made or natural, is 
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of such a large magnitude, alternate facilities may also be rendered unusable. If such a 
worst-case scenario does occur, continuity operations will need to be conducted in a 
fashion that will bring operational functions on-line as quickly as possible at a location 
other than that previously identified. Portable facilities, or other temporary operational 
buildings, may be placed in the immediate area and the need to establish operations 
within these facilities would need to be implemented. The devolution of control and 
direction contains all the elements previously addressed and covered. 
One of the key issues in addressing this section of the COOP plan will be those 
indicators when the COOP will be activated, which is not such a simple process given the 
environment in which these decisions will be made. This section must identify at what 
points this decision will be made, and most importantly, who will make that decision, all 
of which should be previously identified and codified through legal promulgation. These 
decisions will not be made in a vacuum and will not be made without the advent of some 
form of information that will drive the beginning of this process.  
J.  RECONSTITUTION PROGRAM 
The reconstitution phase of operation is implemented when operations are 
assumed ready to transition back to a normal operational environment. This phase may 
not be a move back to the original facility or location, but a move to a different facility 
that will support the operations of the school itself. Examples may include repair of the 
original school facility to begin classes or a move to another facility that better supports 
the school environment, which would be the case if numerous portable classrooms had 
been placed in a different location and a need existed to move to one or two larger 
facilities. In either case, just as with the movement completed originally in the COOP, 
facilities and personnel should be prepared through the reconstitution program to 
complete this move and lessen the educational impact on all personnel, students and staff. 
K.  SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
One area of special consideration should be those issues that concern those 
individuals covered under the regulation dealing with students with disabilities, which 
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was briefly covered in the alternate facilities section, but should be reemphasized to 
ensure facilities meet the needed requirement of students with disabilities. While schools, 
during normal operations, are required to meet the established guidance for those with 
disabilities, a unique, and somewhat difficult, challenge to schools involving alternate 
facilities is presented, which is a major consideration when schools are not meeting these 
requirements at the main campus of the school. The 2007 Emergency Management-Most 
School Districts Have Developed Emergency Management Plans, but Would Benefit from 
Additional Federal Guidance indicates that “…officials in three school districts stated 
that the districts’ school building are not all in compliance with the Americans with 
Disabilities Act standards, thus limiting the district’s ability to adequately plan for 
students with special needs” (p. 42). While this number is only a reflection of a specific 
area surveyed, the issue may be present in other school districts located across the United 
States, which adds an additional issue that must be explored and rectified. 
Since 1990, public schools have been subject to Title II of the American 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), which requires schools to be built after 
January 26, 1992, to comply with federal ADA Accessibility guidelines. 
Schools built prior to this date are not required to comply, but they must 
“make each program, service, activity, when viewed in its entirety,” 
accessible by reassigning services to an accessible location; purchasing, 
redesigning, or relocating equipment; assigning personal aides; or making 
physical changes to facilities. (National Clearinghouse for Educational 
Facilities, 2008, p. 2) 
When obtaining alternate facilities, these unique challenges must be addressed for 
not only ensuring identified students with disabilities are able to continue the educational 
process, but also to ensure the established laws both at the federal and state level are 
followed and enforced. When locating these facilities, entities must “…give special 
consideration to the unique needs of staff and students with disabilities when developing 
the crisis plan. Evacuation and relocation procedures will need to address mental, 
physical, motor, developmental, and sensory limitations” (National Clearinghouse for 
Educational Facilities, 2008, p. 3). As previously identified, schools at the K-12 level are 
not included in the requirement for the development of COOPs. It is, therefore, postulated 
that issues outlined by the ADA have not been considered as well. 
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L.  SCHOOL RECONSTRUCTION 
COOPs normally will not include issues that deal with the reconstruction of 
school facilities as a whole. The main concern with COOPs is ensuring that the learning 
environment for students is continued without interruption or, at the very least, minimum 
disruptions. However, a concern still exists that must be examined in how school districts 
will be supported during this operational period and what measures will be available to 
assist in this endeavor to ensure the COOP process is successful. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance-Public Assistance Guide FEMA 322 
(June 2007) provides an excellent source of information to assist school districts in 
determining what sources of assistance are available in implementing the COOP and 
reconstructing the school facility. For the purpose of this exploration, first it is required 
that the eligible agencies be identified for inclusion in this process.  
State and local governments agencies are eligible applicants for Public 
Assistance….A multitude of local governments…, including…regional 
authorities organized under State law, school districts, and rural 
unincorporated communities represented by the State or a political 
subdivision of the state. The general principle for eligibility is that the 
facilities must be open to the public. (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2007, p. 9) 
While this definition provides a general overall provision for schools to receive 
assistance in the obtainment of funding, further clarification is required under this 
guidance. Schools, because of their non-profit nature in providing educational service 
within the community, are termed as Private Nonprofit Facilities (PNP). Eligible PNPs 
are those facilities that provide “…education, medical, custodial care, emergency, utility, 
certain irrigation facilities, and other essential governmental service” (United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 10). Educational PNPs…are defined in terms 
of primary, secondary, and higher education schools. For primary and secondary schools, 
an educational institution is a day or residential school that provides primary and 
secondary education as determined under state law (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2007, p. 15).  
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1.  Temporary Facilities 
When the primary educational facility is rendered unusable for any length of time, 
it will be necessary to either move, under the COOP guidance, to another facility, or have 
the ability to obtain temporary educational facilities, which could either be buildings 
previously identified through MOUs/MOAs or modular facilities for use on the school 
grounds or elsewhere. Under the public assistance (PA) program, included would be the 
“…construction of a temporary bridge or detour road to replace an essential crossing 
facility, temporary hookup of utilities, and essential temporary buildings for schools or 
government offices” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 73).  
2.  Equipment and Supplies 
When an educational facility is lost, or is damaged beyond its ability to operate, 
much of the associated equipment that supported the educational process, not just the 
buildings themselves, will be lost. “Eligible educational facilities include buildings, 
housing, classrooms plus related supplies, equipment, machinery, and utilities of an 
educational institution necessary or appropriate for instructional, administrative, and 
support purposes” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 16). Items, 
such as furniture, equipment, books and other consumable items that supported the 
educational operation, are included.  
Transportation is another area of equipment that would need to be considered. For 
many school age children, busses may be the only form of transportation available to 
transport them to school. If busses are rendered useless, or are being used for other 
emergency operations, a need for temporary or permanent replacements will need to be 
addressed. The emergency transportation, such as “…additional school buses to transport 
relocated student, or new bus routes, may be eligible for assistance, but only through 




3.  Relocation 
Relocation of facilities falls into two distinct categories for schools. In the case of 
the COOP plan, the first category will be the relocation to temporary facilities to continue 
the educational environment. Whether the school building is damaged to a point where it 
cannot be used until the damage has been corrected or whether the facility is render non-
accessible, these costs can be claimed under the PA programs. Any related cost for 
movement to the alternate facility or to another location to reestablish the educational 
process will also be a reimbursable cost under this program. If facilities are required to be 
used, such as another commercial building or the rental of temporary facilities, these 
would also be a reimbursable cost. 
The second category is a permanent movement due to the location of the existing 
facility. If the facility is located in an area that had numerous issues in the past, such as 
flooding, or because of previously existing hazardous conditions, this would be a 
consideration under the existing PA guidance. “An applicable federal, state or local 
standard, such as a floodplain management regulation, may require that a damaged 
facility be relocated away from a hazardous area” (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2007, p. 39). Because of these regulations, caution should be 
exercised when this type of facility relocation is considered. According to the guidance, 
…FEMA will provide assistance for the relocation project only if it is cost effective and 
not barred by any other FEMA regulations or polices” (United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 2007, p. 39). 
M.  DISASTER INTELLIGENCE 
This process in the COOP will assist in the development of specific needs of a 
school and assist in planning scenarios. In most cases, schools will not need formal, in-
place informational or intelligence gathering systems. However, because schools are a 
vulnerable asset to the community, numerous informational operational considerations 
must be reviewed to assist schools in formulating their respective COOPs.  
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Before, during and after disasters, these information resources will assist in 
planning options that could not be realized without them. The number and sources of 
such information are limited only by the imagination of the local individual tasked with 
such responsibility. “Establishing a strong relationship with state and local public safety 
officials, emergency operations centers, local first responders, community partners…and 
developing interdistrict and interagency agreements will foster the sharing of human and 
material resources well before a disaster occurs” (United States Department of Education, 
2007, p. 7). 
Disaster intelligence “…identifies the type of information needed, where it is 
expected to come from, who uses the information, how the information is shared, the 
format for providing the information, and any specific times the information is needed” 
(United States Department of Homeland Security, 2010b, p. 24). Schools must be able to 
reach out to community programs to address threats continually that schools may face 
and be able to adapt COOPs based on the aforementioned information. With school 
locations near nuclear power plants, hazardous materials sites and the threat posed by 
severe weather events, all have a major impact on the operations of the COOP for school 
recovery. Other issues, such as terrorism, criminal and gang threats, can also be issues 
that will impact the development of COOPs for schools. As Barnes (2011) clearly 
identifies, developing an idea of those hazards that may affect a local school district or 
municipality includes such areas as crime or school incidence statistics; local facilities 
housing hazardous materials storage; major interstates and highways, public works 
projects and facilities, military installations and prisons (p. 15). While many issues can 
affect the process for a COOP, the greatest threat to the operation of a school will 
normally come in the form of a natural disaster. Florida, therefore, may be more prone to 
these types of events and must consider these issues. To meet this threat, as well as 
others, numerous programs, and opportunities, for informational distribution can be 
found at the local, state and federal levels. Each of these programs will assist a school in 
developing these plans and provide real time information for detailing when, and to what 
level, a COOP should be activated. 
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1.  Fusion Centers 
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, agencies found that information that could have 
indicated the attack was occurring was tied up in a bureaucratic framework that did not 
allow for the cross-feed of threat information. As a result of this failure, fusion centers 
were developed to help receive and distribute threat information to organizational entities 
within the affected area. According the Fusion Center Guidelines-Developing and 
Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era, “ [a] fusion center is an effective and 
efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize resources, 
streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging 
data from various sources” (United States Department of Homeland Security, n.d.f, p. 3). 
Fusions centers provide a one-stop operational information program whereby schools, 
through their designated representative, can garnish information that may pertain to 
threats against schools within the particular area; this capability is presently being 
considered. Through this liaison, information can be used to develop specific plans to 
meet the threat that a school faces and provide real time warning application for 
administration and teachers. This informational source can provide valuable planning 
considerations and save planning time for pertinent threats versus preparing for threats 
that do not exist within the area. 
2.  Regional Domestic Security Task Force 
The Regional Domestic Task Force (RDSTF) concept is one of bringing 
professional experts together to provide guidance and informational systems to specific 
operational areas. The 2009–2011 Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan, Partners: 
Taking Steps to Ensure a Safer Tomorrow states, “Each RDSTF consists of local 
representatives from disciplines involved in prevention and response, including: law 
enforcement, fire/rescue, emergency medical services, emergency management, 
hospitals, public health, schools and businesses” (p. 6). RDSTFs are currently developing 
guidelines through identified sub-committees to develop appropriate programs to ensure 
school safety. These programs can provide appropriate training activities to school 
personnel, as well as provide informational sources for appropriate threat awareness. 
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3.  Emergency Management 
Emergency Management (EM) and Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) within 
Florida are operational in every county and provide numerous resources for the support 
of COOP development and initiation. “Local, state and federal emergency management 
agencies can often provide [schools] with free training, as well as other necessities 
before, during and after a crisis” (Dorn, 2009). Emergency management directors can 
provide pertinent threat information that may be present within the area of the school, as 
well as specific guidance on how to meet this threat. In the state of Florida, every school 
is under a threat of severe weather and liaison with local EOCs can provide real time 
information that will supply the warning framework to make COOP initiation a more 
timely function. EOCs have access to systems and data that can warn of severe weather 
issues that will affect the operational aspect of school. Most recently, this warning was 
evident in the tornado outbreak of April 2011 where numerous schools were either 
damaged or destroyed. While these programs cannot stop a natural disaster from 
occurring, they can provide specific information to develop planning scenarios that can 
then be applied against COOP operational parameters. This informational platform would 
provide the ability to test plans against site-specific scenarios without disrupting the 
educational process. 
4.  National Weather Service 
The National Weather Service offices, in concert with the local and state 
emergency operations centers, can provide informational guidance before, during and 
after a severe weather outbreak. One key element of this process is the Storm Ready 
program available to local and state agencies, as well as schools. The Storm Ready 
program is designed to develop guidance for ensuring a facility or organization is 
prepared to meet the threat of natural disasters that may impact the area. Through this 
program, schools can enhance informational reception that can warn of the approach of 
natural disasters that may threaten the area and particularly the school location itself.  
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While this list of informational sources is not exhaustive, it does provide a starting 
point for COOP planners in establishing operational areas for the development of 
programs and guidance. 
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V.  CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLAN REVIEW 
Since a lack in statutorily required laws for COOPs to be established at the K-12 
level in the state of Florida exists, COOPs were either non-existent or would not be 
provided by school organizations. Consequently, COOPs developed at the collegiate and 
governmental levels were reviewed to determine key points that would need to be 
considered for inclusion in a K-12 COOP.  
A.  UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 
“The University of Virginia-COOP is a concise document for use by the school 
administration and staff. The plan specifically outlines its purpose in maintaining 
operational capability of its essential function as follows. 
 Sustain the safety and welfare of university employees, students, and 
visitors 
 Maintain health services 
 Deliver academic programs to the students 
 Preserve critical research 
 Maintain critical businesses, finance and infrastructure operations” 
(University of Virginia, 2010, p. 1). 
A key element of the plan is the inclusion of personnel, especially its key 
personnel, to assist in the continued development of the plan and its implementation.  
The University relies on human capital resources and their flexibility to 
assist COOP team members and the rest of the University population in an 
emergency. University leadership is expected to: 
 Be fully informed and understand human capital tools, flexibilities, 
and strategies 
 Regularly review and update personnel contact information and 
notification protocols to assure that information remains current 
 Ensure employees have a clear understanding of their role in an 
emergency 
 Develop, review, and update emergency guides as needed 
(University of Virginia, 2010, p. 6). 
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This statement in the plan provides a university-wide approach to the COOP 
process as a whole and provides focus for leadership to guide the implementation of the 
plan. This paragraph provides for the development of those who will implement the plan 
and for the document to be a living and breathing document that does not allow for 
stagnation.  
The basic plan follows the general guidance as outlined in the federal COOP 
guidance documents, such as essential functions, alternate facilities, orders of succession, 
delegation of authority, vital records and communications. The plan does go beyond these 
basic titles and includes annexes for each of these functions, which provides a basic 
guidance document for the overall school, as well as for an ease of obtaining more 
specific information under these titles and of maintenance as the plan matures. 
One of the most unique aspects of the University of Virginia COOP is the use of 
what is termed “scenario specific considerations” (University of Virginia, 2010, p. 13) 
designed to provide prior planning responses within a safe environment. These scenarios 
provide an outline of the most appropriate response without encumbering day-to-day 
operations. The scenarios recognize that while the basic plan provides an all-hazard 
approach, nuances will always occur that are indicative of the numerous operations 
within the school and need to be addressed. 
B.  COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 
The College of William and Mary plan follows part of the outlined subject areas 
in the federal COOP guidance documents. The college specifically identifies essential 
functions, alternate facilities, orders of succession, delegation of authority, and testing 
and training. Other areas, such as communications and vital records, are not addressed in 
the plan. The COOP is developed as a basic plan with departmental annexes designed by 
specific departments to meet their specific needs. The annexes are based on a 




The College of William and Mary has taken action that provides for a more 
comprehensive approach in identifying the specific needs of the university. “[T]he 
College was awarded a Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance Program (CEDAP) 
grant that provided the college with the Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment 
Model ((HLS-CAM) to perform a comprehensive threat assessment of the college” 
(Common Wealth of Virginia, 2007, p. 13). As a result of this review and assessment, 
similar to the COOP established by the University of Virginia, scenarios have been 
created to provide a specific response action to identified threats. These scenarios provide 
the ability to apply specific threat responses prior to an actual incident occurring. 
C.  LOUISIANA DELTA COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
The Louisiana Delta Community College COOP does not follow the standard 
outline provided by federal guidelines except in one area. The vital records component of 
the COOP is extensive in its application and coverage, and, in several instances, provides 
redundant backup for all documentation.  
Each member of the Recovery Preparedness Team (RPT) ensures that 
each department under their supervision stores back-up files of all critical 
data to the IT server and then documents the location of the back-up files 
on the server. Delta’s IT Department stores back-up files of the IT server 
data at an off-site location….Computer files are stored in a safe deposit 
box at Bank One and paper files are stored at the Spare Room. (Louisiana 
Delta, n.d., p. 4)  
Each department has a specified cross-section of information for inventory 
identification of vital files and various storage mediums divided between paper copies, 
files located on servers and electronic storage devices. While the data documentation 
requirements provide electronic back up files, some do not. This difference would create 
a disparity when attempting to recover all the documentation. Some of the documentation 
is completely paper based and could be lost in an incident with no back up provided. One 
aspect of preparation involves the use of thumb drives to maintain the information. This 
requirement adds to the portability of the information if these same thumb drives were to 
be added to the drive away kits. 
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D.  PIEDMONT VIRGINIA COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
The Piedmont Virginia Community College COOP does not follow the standard 
outline provided by federal guidelines except in one area concerning the testing and 
exercise of the plan. The plan is extremely generic and provides only a direction where 
information concerning specific aspects of the continuity of the plan can be found. The 
COOP does refer to a confidential portion of the plan annex, which was not available and 
may bring into question persons who would have access to it in case of an emergency. 
The plan does provide a succession of authority to activate the plan, but does not indicate 
in any portion of the plan where this has been codified or promulgated as a legal 
document. The plan as a whole is extremely generic and would be difficult to institute 
prior or during a disaster. One key area of the plan that should be considered for all plans 
is the continual assessment of the risk as it involves the business view of the process. 
A risk assessment of college business functions will be conducted once 
each calendar year. The assessment will be used to determine which 
business functions have the greatest impact on continuing operations. In 
particular, the assessment will include information regarding the impact of 
service delays and the adequacy of contingency plans in the event of 
emergency conditions. (Piedmont Virginia Community College, 2011, p. 
20) 
In a number of cases, COOPs are developed and then not updated until the next 
incident has occurred that causes an update to be implemented. In more cases than not, 
this update is applied too late to prevent a loss of operational application. This statement 
within the plan provides a notice that these plans will be visited at least yearly to ensure 
that applicable business practices are addressed and the plan stays current with a fluid 
environment. 
E.  LAKE-SUMTER METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION 
The Lake-Sumter Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) COOP is one of the 
most extensive plans reviewed. The plan follows the outlined guidance established by 
federal guidelines and provides a concise informational base to follow in the application 
of the continuity of operations. The line of succession is clearly identified with three 
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persons being identified by name and position. Additionally, the delegation of authority is 
clearly outlined in line with the line of succession and provides, at least in name and 
position, the authority of said person to make decisions. One key point identified as 
missing concerns the promulgation of legal documentation that outlines these 
fundamental identifications, which may or may not be a requirement at this level and 
within this organization. This dissemination may be a consideration because of the 
damage that the area received from tornadoes in 2007 and would need to be addressed in 
the plan as a whole. As with the previously reviewed plan, a specifically defined time 
frame during which the plan will be reviewed exists. “The COOP will be examined on an 
annual basis. It is not anticipated that the MPO should need a multi-year strategy and 
program management plan” (Lake-Sumter MPO, 2007, p. 9). The Lake-Sumter 
Metropolitan Planning COOP provides an excellent base plan for other organizations to 
consider and adapt for their organizational application. 
F.  IDENTIFIED PRACTICES 
While the depth of each plan differs, the basic guidance outline for a COOP 
development remains constant in some of the plans reviewed. Each plan has specific 
points that should be included in the COOP process to develop viable plans for K-12 
schools and aid in the continued operation of the school after a disaster. These points, 
when incorporated with the previously discussed areas identified for inclusion, could 
develop an excellent baseline guidance and policy for a K-12 COOP. As with any plan 
developed to meet certain threats or needs, it must be compared to the processes and 
needs unique to that particular institution. Once these plans are developed, they can only 
be tested through application in an actual disaster or through a specific exercise to cause 
further development of the plan. The Test, Training and Exercise Program section of 
COOPs addresses this process and should be used to improve the overall process.  
Each of the plans focuses on different areas of the COOP process and each 
provides its own unique application for continued operations. Due to the different levels 
and need of schools in general, no individual plan can address every situation. However, 
some key elements do emerge that should be included in the operational development of 
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the COOP for K-12 schools. Each of these elements, in concert with those provided 
previously in the Policy/Strategy Elements of K-12 School Continuity of Operations Plan 
(COOP) portion of this document, would need to be included, or at the very least 
considered, in the development of a COOP. 
 Personnel Inclusion. Through the inclusion of all personnel from 
administration, staff and support personnel, the ability to identify 
specifically those elements that impact the academic process are 
addressed, which would be evidenced at a lower level by identifying those 
specific needs of the support facilities in case a school must be relocated. 
The support staff can provide an idea of what the alternate facilities would 
require to meet current standards of the academic facility. The same could 
be said of the teaching staff, as it would be in the best position to identify 
what is required to keep the academic process intact and operating. This 
process also provides familiarity with the specific operations of the COOP 
and support for the plan. 
 Specific Annexes. Through the development of a basic plan, a general 
direction and overview of the COOP is provided to the academic staff. 
The plan is general in its application as not to lock in a specific 
department, or other agency in the school, into a plan that may not address 
the department’s operational parameters. Through the development of 
standardized framework annexes, specific nuances can be developed by 
each department to meet the overall strategy of the COOP and to provide a 
greater ability to maintain a living, breathing document and reduce time 
requirements to keep the COOP updated. 
 Data Backup. Complete data backup utilizing internal and external 
systems provides the ability to save, and change, data as needed. Internal 
information needed to support operational functions of the organization 
can be accomplished utilizing systems, such as thumb or flash drives. 
These drives can provide ease of update for the individual departments, as 
well as everyday use for presentation of the academic materials. Also 
provided is the ability for departments to place these drives in a drive 
away kit to move all documentation to an alternate facility if required. 
Data backup can be accomplished as well through offsite backup systems. 
Through a “cloud computing” network, remote computers at the alternate 
sites could access files. The cloud computing technique would allow the 
greatest security for associated materials, but would need to be backed up 
by every department on thumb or flash drives. The cloud computing 





 Authorities and References. These authorities and references provide the 
legal bases for the implementation and operation of the COOP as a whole. 
While some organization may not be required by local ordinances or other 
legal requirements to have these referenced, basic documents as they 
pertain to state and federal operations may need to be considered for 
inclusion. At the very least, source documents at the federal level, as they 
involve COOP operational planning, should be included to provide 
baseline information for those involved in COOP application. These 
documents could assist these personnel in fully understanding the 
applicable directives outlined and the reason for such issues. 
 Reviews. Review dates should be established and codified in the plan to 
guide those responsible for development, and maintenance, of the plan to 
provide continued applicability to those COOP processes. In many cases, 
plans are developed as a statutorily identified process with no follow up, 
or requirements, for their continued maintenance. This fact may cause a 
plan to become dated and ineffective. 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Florida is unique in that it has experienced a myriad of disasters over the past 20 
years that have affected critical infrastructure. Additionally, it has the benefit of a robust 
state and local emergency management organizational structure for consultation and 
advisement. This structure provides a readily available informational network, or disaster 
intelligence outlet, that can provide up-to-date and real time information. These two 
factors alone provide a starting point for the development of COOPs for the Florida K-12 
school system.  
A COOP is not a new concept, but one of necessity because of differing 
catastrophic events. The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and 
the landfall of Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, showed the need for a comprehensive plan 
to continue operations after a disaster or other operational failure. Due to such a threat, 
Florida mandated that continuity plans be developed for entities within the university 
system, as well as other governmental agencies, which is promulgated by statute. As the 
research indicates; however, this has not been the case for other educational institutions at 
the lower levels. This fact leaves K-12 at a unique disadvantage if a disaster were to 
occur affecting a school anywhere in the state. 
During a normal day in the United States, approximately 53 million children are 
involved at some level of K-12 school or daycare, which represents approximately one-
sixth of the population of the United States. Applying this same percentage of children 
attending school in the United States to those attending school in the state of Florida, 3 
million children could possibly be affected by a disaster. “Florida itself has been struck 
by more storms than any other state and, is in fact…the most hurricane-prone and fourth 
most populous state in the country” (Peltier, 2011, p. 37) and would be the largest 
benefactor of a COOP process. If coupled with the fact that the state has “…18.1 million 
people, most of whom live within 10 miles of the state’s 1,200-mile coastline…” (Peltier, 
2011, p. 37), the need for a COOP process is paramount. 
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It is evident, through the research, that policy and guidance has been developed 
within other organizational frameworks. Schools, at the upper levels of the academic 
realm, located both in and out of the state of Florida, as well as governmental and private 
organizations, have developed some level of COOP policy and guidance to ensure 
continued operations in case of disruption or disaster. These COOPs provide the basic 
standard framework that K-12 school COOPs should mirror in their application. Areas 
for consideration or inclusion, such as vital records, and human capital, have also been 
standardized in documentation found at these levels, as well as policy and guidance 
documents developed by federal entities for other federal and non-federal organizations. 
Two of these federal guidance documents that should be consulted include the Continuity 
Assistance Tool (CAT) Continuity Assistance for Non-Federal Entities (States, 
Territories, Tribal, and Local Government Jurisdictions and Private Sector 
Organizations) and the Continuity Guidance Circular 2 (CGC 2) Continuity Guidance 
for Non-Federal Entities: Mission Essential Functions Identification Process, States, 
Territories, Tribes, and Local Government Jurisdictions. These documents provide 
innumerable amounts of information in their application and provide excellent examples 
of what a K-12 COOP should include. By utilizing the previously identified information, 
as well as the guidance and checklists provided by federal COOP programs, a K-12 
COOP can be developed that meets the minimum requirements needed for a viable 
program.  
Due to these facts, and the unique location of the state, ample opportunity is 
provided for the application and testing of a school district K-12 COOP. At this point of 
research, it can only be ascertained as to the effectiveness of the COOP by following a 
prescribed testing and exercise application of the plan; no full COOP implementation has 
been completed within the K-12 school system. Until such time as the plan is utilized in 
an actual situation in which the school implements the partial, or full, COOP plan, this 
testing and exercise requirement will remain the only procedure for, and only means of, 
determining validity for the state of Florida developed K-12 COOPs. 
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VII.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina brought renewed focus of the 
importance of COOP in enhancing required federal, state and local entities response in 
maintaining operational capability to serve the public. However, lost in all this pre-
planning and preparation, was the importance of planning for the future operational needs 
of the K-12 school system, which was still not a consideration after numerous disasters 
impacted K-12 schools around the country and disrupted the educational process as 
demonstrated by the devastating tornadoes, which in 2007 and 2011, heavily damaged, or 
destroyed, many schools beyond repair or reoccupation. A statement was made after the 
tornado outbreak of April 2011, which destroyed several schools, that a procedure for 
bringing a school back into operation after such an event had yet been written. However, 
the basic plan and guidance for such procedures was written many years prior to these 
incidences occurring and were never considered for application at this level. The 
framework for such plans lay in guidance developed for federal, state and many local 
governments in the development of COOPs for their parent organization. By utilizing 
existing guidance, and applying it in the academic framework, COOPs, to meet the needs 
of the K-12 schools levels, can be developed and applied.  
As for the state of Florida, utilizing existing COOP frameworks from other 
entities can provide the basic guidance for developing a viable and operational COOP 
that can meet identified threats for the state. Since Florida statutes have outlined COOP 
requirements for governmental agencies, as well as universities operating in the state, 
policy and guidance has already been created at this level. By incorporating the same 
principles to the K-12 level of the academic environment, an effective COOP may be 
developed for a school district. While different nuances will exist in the operations of a 
university, or even a business, many of the same requirements for the K-12 school will be 
evident in the process. By utilizing guidance and associated checklists found in such 
documentation as the Continuity Assistance Tool (CAT) Continuity Assistance for Non-
Federal Entities (States, Territories, Tribal, and Local Government Jurisdictions and 
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Private Sector Organizations) a starting point for the COOP development process is 
already established. Additionally, the Continuity Guidance Circular 2 (CGC 2) 
Continuity Guidance for Non-Federal Entities: Mission Essential Functions 
Identification Process, States, Territories, Tribes, and Local Government Jurisdictions, 
should be utilized to further enhance this process.  
The following recommendations are provided to foster this development and 
application to ensure academic continuity for schools in the state and provide a guidance 
and policy document to ferment this application. 
 Mandate COOP Requirements for K-12 Programs. Florida statutes already 
require universities and other governmental organizations to develop these 
plans; the same should be required of the K-12 schools system as a whole. 
Through this process, the state of Florida would provide a universal 
application, as well as policy and guidance, of the process, which would 
enhance the process in that state would have one COOP program and 
provide a basic starting point for all agencies. 
 Explore Similar COOPs from Other Programs. This assessment is a basic 
process of reviewing what already exists; it provides a cost-effective 
solution without incurring a large cost to K-12 academic organizations. In 
reviewing COOPs from various organizations, both in the public and 
private industry, commonality abounds in the application of the process to 
include also a review of other state educational organizations COOPs to 
garner the best practices exhibited by these programs. Thus, an 
opportunity would be provided to see what is, or is not, applicable if these 
plans have been activated in an actual incident. Plans created by these 
organizations can provide a blueprint and guide for development of 
COOPs for local schools across the state. This process need not be one of 
creating new documents, but one of adapting current operational policies 
and issues schools have or are considering. 
 Use Existing Guidance. Policies and guidance created at the federal and 
state levels can be adapted to the K-12 school level and provide a basic 
document that all schools across the state can employ to meet their basic 
requirements. New guidance documents do not need to be created, just 
adapted. These documents, along with the elements identified in the 
Policy/Strategy Elements of K-12 School Continuity of Operations Plans 
(COOPs), can provide the necessary direction for plan development. 
 Create a Lessons Learned/Best Practices Database. COOPs have been 
developed by many organizations, including some involving K-12 schools, 
but are not being shared with outside organizations to use as a best 
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practice knowledge base. The DHS)has established the password protected 
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) database for use by 
organizations across the United States. This database provides best 
practice information that has been applied to numerous situations with 
results and suggestions. The same program should be established in 
Florida to provide a readily available database for schools at every 
academic level. This ability to exchange COOP ideas, and offer best 
practice suggestions, provides a cost effective system to develop 
applicable plans. As schools develop COOP plans of their own, they 
could, and should, be placed in this database to provide a readily 
accessible informational product to incorporate in developing plans for 
other schools. 
 COOPS Should Not Remain Static. COOP development will not be a 
fixed or static process and should never be locked into the process upon 
completion. As situations and threats change, the COOP must adapt its 
operational guidance to ensure it is still applicable. The review process as 
identified, including the testing application, will assist in identifying 
current issues and failures, as well as ensure the plan remains viable. 
 Consider the All Scenarios. COOP development will be based off many 
factors and scenarios that may affect the academic process. Just because 
something has not happened before, does not mean that it cannot occur 
now, or in the future. While requirements and current threats will drive 
this process, this fact will always be a critical-thinking necessity. The 
ability to think about, and consider, all options beyond the here and now 
will provide benefits that could not be realized by thinking of only the 
possible, or unlikely, occurring. Be reminded that before the Columbine 
High School incident in 1999, no one considered such a violent incident 
happening. In the early 1900s, an incident similar to Columbine High 
School occurred involving a school, but was quickly forgotten in the 
annuals of history. Prior to September 11, 2001, no one considered such 
an attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) occurring, much less utilizing 
fueled aircraft as manned cruise missiles. The fact that a terrorist attack 
had occurred in 1993 on the WTC was still fresh in the memories of New 
York citizens; somehow, this event was lost on those responsible for 
preventing it. 
While these recommendations, as well as those identified in the Policy/Strategy 
Elements of K-12 School Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) section are not 
exhaustive, they provide a beginning point for COOP development for Florida K-12 
schools. By executing a comprehensive review of policy and guidance in existing plans, 
as well as previously created federal documentation, an effective plan can be developed 
for the continuance of the educational process. It has been proven that organizations that 
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develop such plans within the private and governmental levels, recover quicker and with 
less disruption. The same result could be realized with a well developed and executed K-




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Barker, A. (2011, 28 October). Number of students sickened by shigella increases. 
Retrieved from Fox Carolina website: 
http://www.foxcarolina.com/story/15898196/number-of-students-sickened-by-
shigella-in... 
Barnes, J. (2011, May/June). 5 essentials of Emergency planning. Leadership. Retrieved 
from association of California school administrators website: 
http://www.acsa.org/FunctionalMenuCategories/Media/LeadershipMagazine/201
1-archives/MayJune-2011.aspx 
Cloud Computing. (n.d.). Retrieved from Wikipedia website: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_computing 
Collins, C. L. (2007). Threat assessment in the post-Columbine public school system: the 
use of crisis management plans in the public school sector as a means to address 
and mitigate school gun violence. International Journal of Educational 
Advancement, 7(1). doi:10.1057/palgrave.ijea.2150043 
Common Wealth of Virginia. Virginia Department of Emergency Management. (2007). 
2008 College of William and Mary comprehensive continuity of operations plan. 
Retrieved from William and Mary website: 
http://www.wm.edu/about/administration.emergency/documents/2008_coop_web.
pdf 
Continuity of Learning. (n.d.). International association for K-12 on-line learning. 
Retrieved from iNACOL website: http://www.inacol.org/col/index.php 
Department of Homeland Security. (2003). National strategy for protection of critical 
infrastructure and key assets. Retrieved from 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Physical_Strategy.pdf 
Department of Homeland Security. (2009) National infrastructure protection plan 
partnering to enhance protection and resiliency. Retrieved from 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf 
Dorn, M. (2009). Emergency managers can be valuable resources. Retrieved from 
Campus Safety Magazine website: 
www.campussafetymagazine.com/Channel/Emergency-
Management/Articles/Print/S... 
Emergency Management. Fl. Stat. 252 (2010). 
 74 
 
Essential Functions. (n.d.). Retrieved from Human Resources IQ website: 
http://www.humanresourcesiq.com/glossary/essential-functions/ 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2003a). Building a disaster resistant 
university. Retrieved from 
http://www.fema.gov/library/file?type=publishedFile&file=dru_report.pdf&fileid
=e16021a0-79a5-11db-9b42-000bdba87d5b 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. (2003b). Primer to design safe school projects 
in case of terrorist attacks. Retrieved from 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/plan/prevent/rms/428/fema428.pdf 
Glenn, J. (2011, Spring). Cross-training should be SOP. Disaster Recovery Journal, 
24(2). 
Government Accountability Office. (2007a). Testimony before the committee on 
homeland security, House of Representatives. Emergency management. Status of 
school districts’ planning and preparedness. Statement of Cornelia M. Ashby, 
director education, workforce, and income security (GAO-07-821T). Retrieved 
from U.S. Government Accountability Office website: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07821t.pdf 
Government Accountability Office. (2007b). Report to Congressional requestors. 
Emergency management. Most school districts have developed emergency 
management plans, but would benefit from additional federal guidance planning, 
overview (GAO-07-609). Retrieved from U.S. Government Accountability Office 
website: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07609.pdf 
Government Accountability Office. (2010a). Report to Congressional requestors. 
Critical infrastructure protection update to national infrastructure protection 
plan includes increased emphasis on risk management and resilience (GAO-10-
296). Retrieved from U.S. Government Accountability Office website: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.item/d10296.pdf 
Government Accountability Office. (2010b). Report to Congressional requestors. Critical 
infrastructure protection DHS efforts to assess and promote resiliency are 
evolving but program management could be strengthen (GAO-10-772). Retrieved 
from U.S. Government Accountability Office website: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10772.pdf 




Ketterer, J. J., & Price, B. J. (2007). The business continuity plan: Outline for school 
disaster recovery, 3(4). International Management Review. Retrieved from 
International Management Review (IMA) website: http://www.usimr.org/IMR-4-
2007/v3n407-art1.pdf 
Lady, F. (2011, Spring). Addressing the ‘critical employee’ quandry . Disaster Recovery 
Journal, 24(2), p. 8. 
Lake-Sumter Metropolitan Planning Organization. (2007). Lake-sumter metropolitan 
planning organization continuity of (COOP) operations plan. Retrieved from 
http://www.lakesumtermpo.com/pdfs/Continuity_of_Operations_Plan.pdf 
Louisiana Delta Community College. (n.d.). Disaster recovery & business continuity 
plan. Retrieved from 
http://www.ladelta.edu/institutionalEffectiveness/sacs/Disaster Recovery.pdf 
National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities at the National Institute of Building 
Science. (2008). An investigation of best practices for evaluating and sheltering 
individuals with special needs and disabilities. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncef.org/pubs/evacuating_special_needs.pdf 
National Strategy Forum, Schools: Prudent Preparations for A Catastrophic Terrorism 
Incident. (2003). School Safety in the 21st Century: Adapting to New Security 
Challenges Post 9/11. Retrieved from National School Safety and Security 
Services website: http://www.schoolsecurity.org/school_terrorism_NSF.pdf 
Nationline. (2011, September 6). N.D. schools open late after summer of floods. USA 
Today. 
Peltier, M. (2011). Public safety hurricane season 2011: The man from Walmart.. 
Retrieved from Homeland Security Today website: 
http://www.hstoday.us/focused-topics/public-safety/single-article-page/hurricane-
season-2011-the-man-from-walmart/d4731ce9293356148305eb31b186fb94.html 
Petal, M. (2008). Disaster prevention for schools guidance for education sector decision-
makers. Retrieved from the Prevention Web website: 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7556_7344DPforSchoolssm1.pdf 
Piedmont Virginia Community College. (2011). Safety and security emergency response 
continuity of operations plan. Retrieved from 
http://www.pvcc.edu/docs/emergency_response_coop_safety.pdf 
SchWeber, C. (n.d.). EDUCATION ACCESS=ENTRY+ACADEMIC CONTINUITY. 
University of Maryland, University College, United States. Retrieved from Sloan 
Corporation website: http://www.academiccontinuity.org/?=node/319 
 76 
 
State of Arizona. Pandemic Influenza Planning Guide. (n.d.). Cross training-succession 
planning. Retrieved from 
http://www.hr.state.az.us?State_Employee/PDF/News_Crosstrain.pdf 
United States Department of Education. Emergency Response and Crisis Management 
(ERCM) Technical Assistance Center. (n.d.). Creating emergency management 
plans. ERCM Express, 2(8). Retrieved from Readiness and Emergency 
Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center website: 
http://rems.ed.gov/docs/CreatingPlans.pdf 
United States Department of Education. Lessons Learned From School Crises and 
Emergencies. Emergency Response and Crisis Management (ERCM) Technical 
Assistance Center. (2007). Recovering from natural disasters: Preparation is key. 
U.S. Department of Education, 2(5). Retrieved from Readiness and Emergency 
Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center website: 
http://rems.ed.gov/docs/LL_Vol2Issue5.pdf 
United States Department of Education. (n.d.). Preparing for the flu during the 2009-
2010 school year-questions and answers for school. Retrieved from 
http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/emergencyplan/pandemic/guidance/contin
uity-qa.pdf 
United States Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. (2007). Public assistance guide, FEMA 322. p. 1A. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office. 
United States Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. (2009a). Continuity guidance circular 1 (CGC 1) continuity guidance for 
non-federal entities (states, territories, tribal, and local government jurisdictions 
and private sector organizations. Retrieved from 
http:www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncy/cont_guidance1.pdf 
United States Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. (2009b). FEMA continuity assistance tools (cat) (states, territories, 
tribal, and local government jurisdictions and private sector organizations). 
Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/cat.pdf 
United States Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (2010a). Continuity guidance circular 2 (CGC 2) continuity guidance for 
non-federal entities: Mission essential functions identification process, states, 
territories, tribes, and local government jurisdictions. Retrieved from 
http:www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/coop/cont_guidance.pdf 
United States Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security. (2010b). 




United States Department of Homeland Security. Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 
Best Practices. (n.d.a). State andLlocal Government continuity of operations 
planning: Alternate operating locations. Retrieved from 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=11047 
United States Department of Homeland Security. Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 
Best Practices. (n.d.b). State and local government continuity of operations 
planning: Elements of a Continuity of Operations Plan. Retrieved from 
http://higheredbcs.wiley.com/l3egacy/college/perry/0471920770/chap_resource/c
h08/coop_elements.pdf 
United States Department of Homeland Security. Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 
Best Practices. (n.d.c). State and local government continuity of operations 
planning: Identifying essential functions. Retrieved from 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/displayContent?contentID=11042&milliseconds=13044
68648373 
United States Department of Homeland Security, Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 
Best Practices. (n.d.d). State and local government continuity of operations 
planning: Order of succession. Retrieved from 
https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=11044 
United States Department of Homeland Security. Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 
Best Practices. (n.d.e). State and local government continuity of operations 
planning: Preidentifying critical facilities that require generators during power 
outages. Retrieved from 
https://www/llis.dhs.gov/displayContent?contenID=37629&milliseconds=130447
0116824 
United States Department of Homeland Security. Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 
Best Practices. (n.d.f). State and local government continuity of operations 
planning: Training, test, and exercises. Retrieved from 
https://www/llis.dhs.gov/displayContent?contentID=11048&milliseconds=13044
68236155 
United States Department of Homeland Security. United States Department of Justice. 
(n.d.f). Fusion center guidelines, developing and sharing information and 
intelligence in a new era, guidelines for establishing and operating fusion centers 
at the local, state, and federal levels, law enforcement intelligence, public safety, 
and the private sector-executive summary. Retrieved from Institute for 




United States Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement. (n.d.g). Fact sheet. Continuity of Operations Planning for SEVP-
Approved Schools. Retrieved from 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/pdf/coop_planning_fact_sheet.pdf 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
